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Abstract
The thesis focuses on the macroeconomics of sustainable development and the
extension to energy, water and food security, using a system dynamics approach,
i.e. the methods of differential equations systems with initial values. The work is
divided into three related parts that build a narrative concerning the interaction
between economics, policy, natural resources and society.
First, after reviewing the concepts of complexity in environmental security, a
simple system comprising three coupled differential equations is used to explain
the effects of macroeconomic business cycles on the exploitation of ecological
resources, and from this is inferred an implied importance of averting business
cycles. The concept of entropy production is used to represent the exploitation
of ecological resources.
The second part establishes a system methodology inspired by Post Keynesian
economics to develop the Murray-Darling Basin Economy Simulation Model that
links food production/water users and food consumers at the micro scale, to the
macroeconomic system dynamics. The goal of this study is to integrate and an-
alyze the ecological-economic system in the Murray-Darling basin. The concepts
of entropy production, useful work and income distribution are used as a bridge
between the micro and macro subsystems. The system parameters are estimated
using an ecological-economic dataset for the Murray-Darling basin and for Aus-
tralia (where data of the Basin are unavailable) from 1978-2005, and the model
is validated using data from 2006-2012. The results reveal important structural
linkages between the two subsystems and are used to predict the consequences of
business cycles and government intervention for the coordination of growth and
sustainability.
The third, and final, part presents the development of an “Asian Food Security
Risk Engine” that predicts the threat of civil unrest from food insecurity in Asian
developing countries. A basal characteristics index for each developing country
in Asia is defined and evaluated. Based on these measures, and introducing the
concept of flow of anger, we use a differential equation system to integrate the
threat of food security, the trigger for food riots, and food policy. The system
parameters are estimated using a dataset tracking indexes for threat, trigger and
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policy for Asian developing countries from 2006-2008, and the model is validated
using data from 2009-2012. The results show the possible alternative approaches
to simulating threat severity from food insecurity and are used to predict the
threat of social unrest due to food security for a given country one month ahead.
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Preface
As I turn to complete my thesis draft today, the three big news events from
around the world are Climate Panel Cites Near Certainty on Warming in The
New York Times, More water releases may lift River Murray inflows into SA
in ABC News, and Egypt arrests supreme leader of Muslim Brotherhood amid
crackdown on protests in Fox News. There is ever increasing evidence that these
three events are not independent, but are fundamental to a bigger picture. Each
is a different dimension of the challenge of sustainable development - reconciling
economic, societal and the environmental imperatives.
The approach to, and attainment of, sustainable development requires a suf-
ficiently strong scientific foundation. The issue of global climate change shows
a typical evolution from realization to the development of abatement and adap-
tation strategies using the natural and physical sciences. Our understanding of
global climate change is rapidly increasing along with the development of mod-
ern technologies and their applications. For instance, Geographic Information
Systems (GIS) and remote sensing makes big data available for climate analysis
from both historical and current perspectives. The evolution of modern comput-
ers provides an increasing potential for processing the available climate data.
However, while having a scientific foundation is a necessary condition, it is
not sufficient. The human dimensions, such as politics and economics, play a
major role in the implementation of scientific solutions. Humans may deserve
the benefits from our accomplishments; meanwhile, our accomplishments have
costs that humans must bear. Unfortunately, human nature is such that we
underestimate the costs, and overestimate the benefits. Almost every generation
has its own set of issues and political controversies that arise. For instance,
the potential solutions to over-exploitation of the Murray-Darling basin have
even more economic and political perspectives than scientific ones. Therefore the
development of economic analyses is at least as important as scientific analyses,
and more important still, is the ability to unite them into a single integrated
picture.
Even though the scientific and economic analyses are available, the failure
to integrate them and convert them into mutually consistent policies results in
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conflict, not only in the long run but also the short run. North Africa and the
Middle East offer an example. The impact of the Arab spring continues four
years after it started so abruptly, and this follows a pattern that has happened
in countless conflicts throughout history. Hopefully a greater convergence of
economic, societal and environmental perspectives can lead to fewer conflicts in
the future.
The thesis covers all topics mentioned above. However the core has been
always under a common roof, i.e. complexity of sustainable development. It is
ambitious to solve any one question whole, and I recognize my own capacity, but
I still wish my works can contribute a little.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Although apparently modern constructs, the research areas of ecological macroe-
conomics or environmental macroeconomics have a long history. For example, the
first generation of economists in the pre-Keynesian era proposed the importance
of natural capital as an essential limit to the development of an economy. Par-
ticularly, in his seminal work, An Essay on the Principle of Population [MG93],
Robert Malthus highlighted that the limits of nature and the growth of popula-
tion would hurt economic growth, even leading to human disasters. Just after
the start of the industrial revolution, he predicted that prosperity would lead to
population growth and rising demand for food, eventually reaching the natural
limitations of agricultural productivity with catastrophic consequences. However,
with the onset of the industrial revolution and rapid technological progress that
loosened the reigns of a purely organic economy, ecological limits and finite envi-
ronmental inputs were relatively neglected as factors influencing economic growth
for over two hundred years. Even today, there is a faction within macroeconomics
that would like to confine their thinking to the concepts of growth, economic out-
put, unemployment, politics, fiscal and monetary policies, without consideration
of the natural environment. In contrast, there is a growing body of effort ad-
dressing solutions to natural crises, such as climate change, but one that ignores
both the macroeconomic links to ecological limits, and particularly, the effects of
the macro-economy on the environment.
The last half-century has seen a rapid fusion of these two areas, even though
the first use of the term environmental macroeconomics appears after 1990. Either
growth-centered study or distribution-centered study focuses on the economic sys-
tem per se even though technical change is introduced and highlighted. In the face
of the compromise proposed and acknowledged by most macro-economists that
there can be substitution between human-made capital and natural resources,
Herman Daly famously pointed out that it is absurd to talk about substitutabil-
ity between capital equipment and natural capital when the latter is the very
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basis for producing the former.
At the same time, the study of business cycles has attracted and occupied
almost every macro-economist. A large number of explanations and theories
on macroeconomic fluctuations have accumulated as a result. On the causes of
business cycles, Joseph Schumpeter argued that the absorption of technological
change causes cycles; Micha l Kalecki proposed that reduction in the intensity of
innovations causes a disturbance in the cyclical fluctuation; and Hyman Minsky
taught that the causes of business cycles are the expansion and validation of
financial commitments. Once cycles happen, John Maynard Keynes’s analysis of
the business cycle in chapter 22 of The General Theory of Employment, Interest
and Money [Key36] proposed the remedy to stabilize the cycle, that is,
. . . the remedy for the boom is not a higher rate of interest but
a lower rate of interest! For that may enable the so-called boom
to last. The right remedy for the trade cycle is not to be found in
abolishing booms and thus keeping us permanently in a semi-slump;
but in abolishing slumps and thus keeping us permanently in a quasi-
boom.
However, the effects of business cycles causing over-exploitation of ecological
resources have been neglected for a long time. An economic boom brings more
demand through stronger investment and consumption; therefore it leads to a
greater use of ecological resources. When macroeconomic fluctuations exist, eco-
nomic bust follows economic boom, and advocacy for government intervention or
free market advocacy help economic recovery through, respectively, the recovery
of demand or supply. From the perspective of effective demand, economic re-
covery from a low level of utilization relies on a rising wage share, which boosts
output due to the paradox of thrift, which a decrease in the propensity to save
leads to an increase in consumption, thus causing profits and investment demand
to raise after a time lag. This recovery process, or course, requires increased
ecological inputs.
The largest macroeconomic fluctuations bring with them the largest ecological
consumption increases, and this may result in failure of the macroeconomic sys-
tem if the ecological support systems begin to break down. The on-going security
of water and food availability is an old and persistent issue. It currently receives
even greater attention, and not only in developing countries but also in devel-
oped countries. This is due to the confluence of unprecedented stressors including
human-made climate change, increasing population burden, unequal international
trade and unsustainable intergenerational mobility. Better understanding of the
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causes (particularly economic causes) of water insecurity in an advanced coun-
try would give both policy-makers and public the opportunity and time to avert
imminent unsustainable development. More thought on the effects (particularly
social effects) of food insecurity in the developing world gives a deeper insight
into consequences for social dynamics, and an evaluation of appropriate interna-
tional action. The multiplicity and interconnectedness of fine scale (bottom-up)
and broad scale (top-down) factors necessitate a complex system perspective, and
preclude a simple linear cause-effect interpretation.
Water resources are a major public issue in Australia because of their scarcity
and extreme variability. Although the coastal fringes are relatively well endowed
with water, and are therefore where most of the population resides, the interior
is arid and water is very scarce, making Australia the driest inhabited conti-
nent on Earth. The Murray-Darling basin, an interior river basin, lies in south-
eastern Australia and contains more than 20 major rivers as well as important
groundwater systems. Major rivers include the Murray (2,530 km) and its three
main tributaries: the Darling (2,750 km), the Lachlan (1,450 km) and the Mur-
rumbidgee (1,700 km). Covering more than 1 million km2, or approximately 14%
of the continent (roughly equal to the size of France and Germany combined)
the Murray-Darling basin spans most of New South Wales, Victoria, parts of
the states of Queensland and South Australia, as well as the Australian Capital
Territory. Approximately 86% of the water currently used in the basin is sur-
face water, with groundwater providing the rest. Water availability varies greatly
across the basin and almost 80% of the vast catchment area contributes little or
no water to the rivers. The main run-off comes from the southern and eastern
boundaries of the basin.
Average annual water consumption in the basin is approximately 11 billion
m3, which equates to almost half of the annual surface water potential of the
basin. Currently, 84% of the water is used for agriculture. The remainder is lost
during the storage and transfer of irrigation water. The Murray-Darling basin
is Australia’s “food bowl”. Agriculture is practiced across approximately 80% of
its area, accounting for about 40% of the country’s total agricultural production.
The amount of water used to maintain livestock-related agricultural activities
corresponds to around half of Australia’s total water consumption and around
60% of total agricultural water use. As rainfall in the basin is both extremely
variable and on average relatively low, the major rivers of the basin have all
been impounded to provide a more reliable water supply. In addition, significant
inter-basin transfers occur in the south, bringing water from coastal catchments.
Since the 1990s there has been a progressive shift towards integrated water
resources management in the basin. In 1993, the Murray-Darling Basin Com-
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mission was established to promote and coordinate the equitable and sustainable
use of water across the basin. It was replaced in 2008 by the Murray-Darling
Basin Authority, which acts as a government statutory agency. The basin’s wa-
ter resources are managed by the Murray-Darling Basin Authority in conjunction
with the states and territories that make up its catchment area. Its main respon-
sibilities are to measure and monitor water resources in the basin; to prepare,
implement and enforce the management plan; to set surface and groundwater
abstraction limits; and to develop a water rights information service to facilitate
water trading. The severe drought that affected most of south-eastern Australia
(including the southern part of the Murray-Darling basin) began in 1997 and
continued for 12 years, causing significant economic losses across the region. The
average annual rainfall deficit of this drought was similar to that of the 1935-
1945 drought. However, the recent drought has led to a much stronger decrease
in run-off and groundwater recharge. This can be explained by a change in rain-
fall patterns during the 1997-2009 drought: lower inter-annual variability and less
rainfall in autumn and winter. The drought ended with rains that caused some
of the highest flood-waters on record in 2010-2011.
In the coming decades, food insecurity and the threat of global water short-
ages pose the real risk of regional food crises leading to conflicts and mass refugee
movements. The developing economies of Asia are experiencing serious environ-
mental and social problems that threaten to undermine future development, food
security, and regional stability. Rapid economic transformation, increasing in-
come and rising populations in developing countries have been key drivers be-
hind the fast-growing global demand for food. Asia, home to over 4 billion of the
world’s 7 billion people, is the world’s most populous region. The region is central
to meeting the challenge of sustainable food security at the global level. Food
security remains a problem of economic access in Asia as hundreds of millions of
Asians continue to live in extreme poverty. At the same time, a number of com-
plex and interactive trends such as population growth, rising incomes, changing
food consumption patterns, environmental degradation, climate change, growing
competition for natural resources, such as land and freshwater, as well as urban-
ization and industrialization are coming together to exert tremendous pressure on
food systems in the region. How governments and other actors in Asia respond
to emerging food security challenges at home will have far-reaching consequences
for human security and peace and stability of communities and states in Asia and
in other parts of the world.
Food insecurity is inherently interlinked with political security, socio-economic
development, human rights and environmental protection. When food prices
increase sharply and suddenly, they cause hunger and malnourishment in the
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short term, and also lead to potentially longer-term reversals in poverty reduction
and human development by cutting back on health care and education in order
to maintain immediate staple food consumption. Poverty is the main cause of
hunger, and the two have a mutually reinforcing relationship. The scale of poverty
in Asia makes the region’s populations particularly vulnerable to sudden and
sharp increases in food prices, as the poor spend as much as 70% of their household
incomes on purchasing food. Although some countries do have social safety nets
in place to protect poor and vulnerable sections of their populations from food
price hikes, these often suffer from substantial inefficiencies and wastage due to
problems of weak institutional and infrastructural capacity, poor management
practices and corruption. Across the region, smallholders - who produce the vast
majority of Asia’s food - continue to lack stable and secure access to the land
they live and work on, and suffer from livelihood insecurity. Without the surety of
benefiting from long term sustainable use and management of renewable resources
like arable land, rivers, lakes and forestlands, there is often insufficient incentive
for small farming households and communities to invest in such practices that
would otherwise lead to positive outcomes for the environment and agricultural
productivity. When combined with serious levels of poverty and malnourishment,
weak governance, widespread socio-economic inequalities, lack of social justice
and phenomena such as rising food prices, and illegal or forced land eviction
the situation can rapidly escalate to trigger violent protests, demonstrations and
riots. Previous work has suggested some approaches to deal with the prediction
of regional food riots but has not harnessed all of the benefits of systems theory
based on quantifiable catastrophic shifts.
In chapter 3, we develop a simple system comprising three coupled differential
equations which are used to explain the effects of macroeconomic business cycles
on the exploitation of ecological resources. From the linkage between entropy
production, unemployed labor and unutilized capital stock, we show that business
cycles increase the exploitation of ecological resources.
In chapter 4, we develop an alternative economy simulation model based on
effective demand - a concept that connects both economic and ecological systems.
From this new definition we link income distribution and useful work, and there-
fore connect Keynesian economics with ecological economics. We apply this tech-
nique to the Murray-Darling basin through an examination of three perspectives:
the micro land/water user, the micro food consumer and the macro economy, in
order to reflect the feedbacks in the dynamical system and the heterogeneity of
agents within it.
Finally, in chapter 5, we develop an index system by introducing and defining
a basal characteristic index, a dynamic factors index, a trigger potency index,
5
a policy effectiveness index and a threat severity index. We fuse the scheme of
indexes in a system of differential equations in order to predict the threat in the
coming month, given the current situation.
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Chapter 2
Complexity in Environmental
Security
‘Complexity’ is used by many people in many different situations, but is ill-defined
in most contexts. For example, physical scientists use the term ‘complexity’ for
a class of theories to contrast with simple models that are based on Classical
Mechanics, i.e. Newtonian Mechanics, instead of Einstein’s theory, and also use
the term when comparing linear and ergodic models based on Classical Mechan-
ics and the First Law of Thermodynamics respectively. Perhaps the most widely
accepted definition of complexity relevant to natural and economic systems is
provided in the context of complex adaptive systems by Simon Levin [Lev02].
The properties that define a complex adaptive system are (1) diversity and indi-
viduality of components, (2) localized interactions among those components, and
(3) an autonomous process that uses the outcomes of those interactions to select
a subset of those components for replication or enhancement.
The dynamical properties of a complex system are one of its most fundamen-
tal characteristics. Dynamics is defined in the span of time where evolutionary
process can be seen as resembling dynamics. From the aspect of operator theory,
dynamics can be distinguished as either linear or nonlinear. For linear dynamics,
we focus on how to solve it. For the case of nonlinear dynamics, however, ana-
lytical solutions do not generally exist and we must resort to numerical analysis
to characterize the behavior of the system.
Environmental security issues implicate a diverse range of issue, such as en-
ergy, water, and food, which are relevant to the coupling of natural resources
to human behavior. The path towards sustainability and the path of sustain-
able development chosen by people and policy-makers are not the same thing.
The underlying ‘natural laws’ that determine the ongoing availability of natural
resources are immutable and do not respect the external man-made rules that
dictate the dynamics of associated socio-economic systems.
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An essential feature of any successful coupling of ecological and economic
systems is the concept of uncertainty which arises from Keynes’s notion of fun-
damental uncertainty in economic systems. Fundamental uncertainty is consis-
tent with the non-determinant philosophy that admits path dependency of the
evolutionary process. Uncertainty can destabilize a complex system. In other
words, stability is temporary and unknowable while instability is permanent and
inevitable without the intervention of policy.
In this chapter, we will first review the concise definition of complexity. Sec-
ondly, we will introduce the differential equation approach to modeling the com-
plexity in a given system, where we will distinguish the nonlinear properties as
essential. Thirdly, we discuss the significance of openness in a complex environ-
mental system. Next, we will critique the determinant theory. Finally, we link
complexity and sustainability.
2.1 Complexity
Complexity is the idea that “there is a pluralism of levels, systems, and dynamic
patterns of phenomena in the natural, biological and social worlds” [Wib00].
The science of complexity allows investigation of open systems in which “the
collective behaviour of many basic but interacting units evolves over time, with
self-organisation and adaptation” [CH95]. A complex system is a system that
“exhibits nontrivial emergent and self-organizing behaviors” [Mit09]. Although
the definition of complexity is vague and context-dependent [Wib00], a complex
system, particularly in social science, has four key features, i.e. (1) emergence,
(2) low level of predictability at a point in time, (3) limited cognition of individual
agents, and (4) multiple possible histories [Orm09]. Emergence stems from un-
derlying nonlinearities in the system; low level of predictability at a point in time
implies a system out of equilibrium; limited knowledge of individual agents results
in fundamental uncertainty; and multiple possible histories means the system is
uncertain.
2.2 Dynamics
The theoretical analysis of nonlinear phenomena and their simulation is performed
on the corresponding set of nonlinear dynamical system equations. These equa-
tions describe the dynamic evolutionary behavior; that is, the evolution in time of
the system under consideration. There are two main types of dynamical systems
[Str94]: differential equation systems and difference equation systems. Differ-
ential equations describe the evolution of systems in continuous time, whereas
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difference equations are applied to problems where time can be broken down
to a progression of discrete events. The differential dynamical systems target
to construct the relations between the change of variables in the scale of time
and/or space and the variables themselves. The approaches have been developed
for mechanics initially, and have spread on many other areas. Linear differential
dynamical systems are thoroughly studied and a wide range of analytical tools
are available to solve these equations exactly. In contrast, nonlinear differential
operators are more difficult and generally cannot be solved exactly. The common
method to deal with a nonlinear differential operator is to linearize it based on
the Banach fixed-point theorem. In effect, Banach theorem addresses the depen-
dency of the solution on the initial values however the application of the theorem
cannot reveal the dynamics of the system that the nonlinear differential operator
describes.
2.3 Openness
Sheila C. Dow defines an open system as a system in which “not all the con-
stituent variables and structural relationships are known or knowable, and thus
the boundaries of the system are not known or knowable” [Dow96]. Therefore
an open system is a system that is open to “flows of matter, energy or infor-
mation across its boundary” [Hod01]. In closed systems, research can afford to
rely, to a degree, upon testable observations of empirical regularities such as the
well-known relations between temperature, volume and pressure in equilibrium
thermodynamics. Open systems, conversely, typically evade such insight and re-
quire abstractions to categorize components contributing to an event [Say92]. An
ecological-economic system is open rather than closed. There are flows of matter,
energy and information across the boundary of economic system and ecological
system. General equilibrium economics considers the flow between two systems.
In the sense, there is no distinguishing between general equilibrium economics and
non-equilibrium economics. However, we argue that the boundaries of ecological-
economic system are not known or even unknowable. The boundary of the system
is dynamic rather than static. In our environmental security system, i.e. a sys-
tem that embeds into ecological-economic system and that integrates economy to
energy, water or food, openness is inevitable.
2.4 Uncertainty
Keynes argues for fundamental uncertainty in an economic system [Key36]. Mean-
while, deterministic uncertainty can be a characteristic in an ecological-economic
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system. Deterministic uncertainty is the irregular but not random motion in
nonlinear dynamical systems whose dynamical laws uniquely determine the time
evolution of the state of the system from knowledge of its past history. It is not
due to external noise, to the fact that the system may have an infinite number
of degrees-of-freedom or to any “Heisenberg uncertainty”-like relations operating
on the quantum level [EMS04]. The source of the observed irregularity in de-
terministic uncertainty is non-ergodicity and path dependency, i.e. an intrinsic
sensitivity to initial conditions and system parameters.
Biodiversity, and ecosystem stability and resilience are important concerns of
ecologists [May73, Hol73], where biodiversity can link to ecosystem stability, and
contributes to ecosystem resilience. However, in an ecological-economic system,
there is no guarantee attaining stable state even if diversity is enhanced, due to the
intrinsic instability of the market economy, i.e. business cycles. In another words,
the existence of business cycles may weaken the biodiversity and furthermore the
stability. Therefore stability can be temporary while instability is permanent.
2.5 Sustainability
A synthetic system is not only a coupled system that links economic factors
and ecological factors as an input-output flow system, but also an integrated
system that combines the micro-level characters and macro-level characters, and
distinguishes the importance of the characters and factors that appear in the
system.
Simple input-output analysis of energy, matter or information is not sufficient
to create a synthesis of economic and ecological system dynamics. However, it
is not necessary to discard the results from previous system theory developed
by ecologists and economists. Therefore, a synthesis that regards the dynamics,
openness and uncertainty as a whole system should be developed. The idea is to
acknowledge the system dynamic rather than the static, non-equilibrium rather
than equilibrium, to see the system open based on the wholeness of the system,
and to consider intrinsic uncertainty as a basal characteristic.
The synthetic idea is feasible. First, researches on ecosystems from the sys-
temic viewpoint in the past four decade provide the basis for understanding the
new synthesis. Second, the development of Post Keynesian economics since 1930s
has become integrated. Third, an increasing consensus on sustainability and sus-
tainable development can enhance the spread of the new synthetic idea.
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Chapter 3
Business Cycles
Business cycles1 has been defined by Arthur Burns and Wesley Mitchell [BM46]
from the National Bureau of Economic Research of the United States in 1946 as:
a type of fluctuation found in the aggregate economic activity
of nations that organize their work mainly in business enterprises:
a cycle consists of expansions occurring at the same time in many
economic activities followed by similar general recessions, contractions
and revivals which merge into the expansion phase of the next cycle.
The study of business cycles has attracted and occupied almost every macro-
economist. This chapter reviews the issues on business cycles, but does not
concentrate on the economic causes of business cycles or on the explanation of
the emergence of macroeconomic fluctuations. Furthermore, it does not discuss
the disputed viewpoints on business cycles between different economic schools.
The focus here concerns its impacts on natural resource consumption.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.1 presents the interdependency and
interaction between natural and economic systems, where we review the macroe-
conomic impacts that affect climate change, natural forces that affect the economy
and the mechanisms that link the economic system to the natural system. Sec-
tion 3.2 outlines the macroeconomic behavior framework of business cycles, i.e.
recovery, prosperity, recession, and depression. Section 3.3 describes the effect of
business cycles on ecological resource exploitation. Section 3.4 reviews the Post
Keynesian explanation of the causes of business cycles. Section 3.5 presents a
model to link business cycles and entropy production, and section 3.6 describes
the predictions of the model. Section 3.7 discusses the findings and concludes.
1The evolution of thought in the study of business cycles is outlined by Victor Zarnowitz
[Zar85].
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3.1 Two Interacting Systems, One Integrated
System
This section presents the interdependency and interaction between natural and
economic systems where we review the macroeconomic impacts that affect the
natural system, the natural influences that affect the economy, and the mech-
anisms that link the economic system to the natural system. Anthropogenic
impacts on natural systems involve climate change, greenhouse gas emission, wa-
ter/air/soil pollution and biodiversity loss. The second law of thermodynamics
is highlighted as a critique of mainstream economic analysis where technological
progress is claimed to mitigate these anthropogenic impacts on the welfare of
future generations. Natural impacts on the economic system focus on drought
and temperature. The contribution of natural resources to economic growth is
also discussed. Finally, viewpoints on the integrated system are reviewed.
3.1.1 Anthropogenic Impacts on Nature
Climate change and greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) come from both natural
and anthropogenic sources. The 2007 Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)2 [CPR07] details the un-
equivocal warming of the Earth’s climate over the last 50 years, most of which is
very likely a result of increases in anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. There
has been a rapid 35% rise in atmospheric GHG concentrations since preindustrial
times and in 2005 atmospheric GHG concentrations were higher than any lev-
els recorded or estimated for the previous 650,000 years. Anthropogenic climate
change is having a significant impact on physical and biological systems globally
and at a continental scale in some places [RKV+08]. For example, twentieth-
century anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions has increased the risk of floods
occurring in England and Wales [PAS+11], while food systems are key drivers
of environmental change [PT10] contributing 19%-29% of global anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions [VCI12] where four-fifths of agricultural emissions arise
from the livestock sector [FDG+09].
The consequences of anthropogenic pollution of water [Qui01, KPB+12], air
[FDG+09, GK94, CEGL13] and soil [JJ00, Har93] are significant and are be-
coming increasingly serious in the era of global climate change. For example,
anthropogenic air pollution increases the destructiveness and intensity of tropical
2The Summary for Policymakers of the IPCC Working Group I assessment report Climate
Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis [SQP+13] which was published in 27 September 2013
and will contribute to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report concludes that human influence on
the climate system is clear.
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cyclones in the Arabian Sea [Sri11]. When land is occupied and irrigated, the
associated appropriation of freshwater resources reduce the availability of irriga-
tion water in the surrounding and downstream farmland areas, with the potential
effect of causing water stress and poor water quality in those areas [RSD13].
Human activity also has played a key role in biodiversity loss. Agricultural
activity is a leading cause of biodiversity loss [EE13]. The combination of envi-
ronmental change and biodiversity loss with long term and persistent human dis-
turbance increases vulnerability to abrupt environmental change and ecosystem
collapse [MMGT13]. Land-use change by human activity is significant for agri-
cultural production, emissions and sequestration of greenhouse gases, open-access
recreational visits, urban green space, and wild-species diversity [BHM+13].
Economic activities need energy. Economists generally agree on the first law
of thermodynamics [NAB+13], i.e. we cannot create energy or matter. However,
most economists neglect the second law of thermodynamics, i.e. large energy
inputs are required to maintain highly organized systems. This omission leads
to an underestimate of the impacts of economic growth on energy flow and un-
derrates the contribution of energy on economic activities. The contributions
of useful work (the sum total of all types of physical work by animals, prime
movers and heat transfer systems) to economic development are highlighted by
Robert Ayres and his colleagues [AAW03, AW05, Ayr08, WAE+10, WA10]. They
included changes in energy and useful work consumption, energy efficiency and
related gross domestic product (GDP) intensity measures. Finally, the authors
tested the replacement of raw energy by useful work as a factor in a Cobb-Douglas
production function, and conclude an almost zero Solow residual3 depending on
other economic policies, i.e. the total factor productivity is overestimated.
3.1.2 The Impacts of Nature on the Economy
A direct approach to measuring the impacts of the natural system on economic
activities is to value ecosystem services. The valuation of ecosystem services4,
i.e. estimation of the benefit from conversation of ecosystem services and cost
from the loss, is seen as increasingly important as simultaneous resilience of the
environment and global economy is in doubt. In 1997 Robert Costanza and his
colleagues estimated the current economic value of ecosystem services and argued
that, for the entire biosphere, the value is in the range of 16-54 trillion (1012) US
Dollars per year [CddG+97]. In 2012 Drew Shindell and his colleagues estimated
3The Solow residual measures the change in total factor productivity (the ratio of outputs
produced to inputs used) where most of the growth was attributable to exogenous technical
change in the original Solow/Swan model [Sol56, Swa56].
4Several critical reviews on the economics of biodiversity and wider ecosystem services have
been conducted [DSA+00, ABM12, HH12].
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the benefits of methane emissions reduction are valued at 700 to 5000 US Dollars
per metric ton [SKV+12]. A unique framework for the assessment and valuation
of water quality-related services is also proposed [KPB+12].
Although there is no clear assessment of the impact of anthropogenic climate
change on drought at the local scale [PCH+10], drought hurts the economy and
agriculture. Models predict a 10-40% increase in run-off in eastern equatorial
Africa, the La Plata Basin and high-latitude North America and Eurasia, with
a 10-30% decrease in run-off in southern Africa, southern Europe, the Middle
East and mid-latitude western North America by the year 2050 due to the chang-
ing climate [MDV05]. Environmental problems have contributed to numerous
collapses of civilizations in the past [EE13]. For example, the droughts that
occurred during the disintegration of the Maya civilization represented up to a
40% reduction in annual precipitation [MER12, LBBD12, AH11]. Today a severe
drought imposes a direct cost of 1,605 million US Dollars in Iranian economy
[SST09]. Population growth is in general constrained by food production while
food production depends on the access to water resources [SRMD13].
Temperature also is strongly linked to the economy. The number of record-
breaking events has increased approximately in proportion to the ratio of the
warming trend to the short term standard deviation [RC11]. The negative rela-
tionship between temperature and economic growth was first documented in de
Montesquieu’s seminal work The Spirit of Laws [dMCMS89], which stated that
an “excess of heat” made men “slothful and dispirited”. Recently, William Nord-
haus argued that the temperature-income relationship may not be negative, and
depends on how income is measured: a negative relationship exists if measured
by income per capita, and a positive relationship is found if measured by income
per area [Nor06]. These results are rejected by providing evidence for a purely
negative relationship between temperature and economic activity [NZ11]. At the
micro level, high temperatures lead to large reductions in U.S. labor supply in
industries with high exposure to climate and similarly large decreases in time allo-
cated to outdoor leisure [ZN10]. At the macro level, higher temperatures diminish
worker productivity, decreasing economic growth and agricultural and industrial
outputs in poor countries and suppress agricultural exports of various kinds, as
well as light manufacturing products [DJO08, JO10, DJO12]. The output losses
occurring in non-agricultural and in agricultural production in Caribbean basin
countries due to climate change and the impact on the economy of surface tem-
peratures has also been quantified, i.e. a temporary 1 degree Celsius increase
in surface temperature is associated with a contemporaneous 2.5% reduction in
economic output [Hsi10].
According to the “biodiversity hypothesis”, reduced contact between people
14
and the natural environment may adversely affect the human commensal micro-
biota and its immunomodulatory capacity [HVHF+12]. Biodiversity degradation
is threatening human well-being [DFCT06].
Exploitation of ecological resources is linked to economic growth. Countries
rich in natural resources constitute both growth losers and growth winners. The
Dutch Disease effect is one symptom, where resource booms induce appreciation
of the real exchange rate and makes the non-resource sectors less competitive
[MMT06, VDP11].
3.1.3 Towards a Synthetic System
Faced with interacting economic and ecological systems and unsustainable de-
velopment, the formulation of a unifying synthetic model of the economy and
the environment is as essential a feature of any solution as it is in the physical
sciences [RCC11]. To develop a synthetic system not only needs an understand-
ing of ecosystem valuation and environmental risk assessment but also depends
on a deeper fusion of sustainable ecosystem services and stable macroeconomic
dynamics.
At the micro-level, for example, a coupled hydro-economic spreadsheet model
[MKQ07] is developed for the Murray-Darling basin that allows analyses of water
allocation and use by different sectors including agriculture and environment
under alternative policy scenarios, and examines approaches of acquiring water
for reallocation to the environment, and their impacts on irrigation water use and
regional income from agriculture.
At the macro-level, perhaps the best known integrated economic-environmental
model is Nordhaus’s Dynamic Integrated Model of Climate and the Economy
(DICE) model [BP12, LT12, HK12a]. DICE is a Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans growth
model that has an aggregate world economy interacting with a climate mod-
ule. Gross economic output is determined by an endogenous capital stock, an
exogenously growing labor force, and exogenously improving production tech-
nology. Gross output produces carbon dioxide emissions. Non-abated carbon
dioxide emissions accumulate in the atmosphere and ultimately translate into
global warming, which causes damage proportional to world output. Cumulative
temperature change affects the total output available for allocation by the policy-
maker. The control variables are abatement and consumption, and the residual
output not allocated to these two options becomes capital investment. The state
variables are capital per effective unit of labor, the stock of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere, the change in global mean surface temperature since 1900 and, to
keep track of exogenously evolving variables, time.
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Although addressing some of the same research challenges, ecological eco-
nomics is different from environmental economics in its research methodology.
Therefore, integrated ecological-economic models have dissimilar features. For
example, agent-based modeling is applied to develop a macroeconomic model to
study the impacts of flood risks [SBH13]. An integrated hydro-economic model
is established based on a general equilibrium model [BH08]. Colin Richardson
and his colleagues developed a policy-oriented integrated ecological and economic
model that fuses Post Keynesian economics with ecosystem services as a distin-
guishing methodology [RCC11].
3.2 The Macroeconomic behavior of Business
Cycles
Business cycles describe fluctuations in the macro-economy. According to Micha l
Kalecki [Kal35], business cycles can be divided into four phases, i.e. recovery,
prosperity, recession, and depression where
recovery is the phase of the cycle . . . , when the volume of invest-
ment orders begins to exceed the volume of the demand for restoration
of industrial equipment. But the very volume of the existing indus-
trial equipment is not yet increasing, as deliveries of new equipment
still remain below the demand for restoration of equipment . . . during
prosperity also deliveries of equipment exceed the demand for restora-
tion of the equipment, thus the volume of the existing equipment is
increasing. The rise of [the volume of industrial equipment] at first
hampers the rise of investment orders and, eventually, causes their
drop. The output of capital goods follows suit, and begins to fall
off in the second phase of prosperity . . . during recession investment
orders are below the level of the demand for restoration of the indus-
trial equipment, but the volume of the existing industrial equipment
is still on the increase, since deliveries are still below the demand for
restoration . . . during depression deliveries of equipment are below the
level of the demand for restoration of the equipment, and the volume
of the existing equipment is falling off. The drop in [the volume of
industrial equipment] at first smooths the downward tendency in in-
vestment orders, and then calls forth their rise. In the third phase of
depression the production of capital goods, too, begins to increase.
John Maynard Keynes [Key36] described the succession of economic boom and
slump in terms of the fluctuations of the marginal efficiency of capital relative
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to the rate of interest. The growth cycle model developed by Richard Goodwin
[Goo67] divides business cycles into two phases, i.e. over-accumulation of capital
in the prosperity phase and mass unemployment in the stagnant phase. Kalecki’s
observation on business cycles reflects the disequilibrium between demand and
supply of industrial equipment, the hysteresis of the output of capital goods, and
the failure of application of ergodicity in investment by the holders of capital
that depends on the idea expressed in Say’s Law, i.e. profits determine invest-
ment. When disequilibrium and hysteresis are under the influence of fundamental
uncertainty, any economic decisions determined by accurate mathematical calcu-
lation produces the instability, and only the existence of unemployed labor and
unutilized capital is certain. According to Hyman Minsky’s “financial instabil-
ity hypothesis” [Min86], in an economic depression the economic agents become
pessimistic so that they refrain from investment, and the repayment of the exist-
ing debt and hedge financing dominate in such an environment. As the amount
of debt decreases, investment becomes more vigorous and a bolder speculative
financial climate becomes dominant. At the last stage of prosperity, economic
agents become excessively optimistic and they become engaged in Ponzi financ-
ing. During this stage the finance sector’s equivalent of “pyramid selling” in the
retail sector dominates, i.e. the financiers pay interest to existing bondholders us-
ing funds sourced from new buyers of bonds, rather than from current investment
income earned on the financiers’ existing investment portfolios. However, default-
ing on payments by some of economic agents can trigger off a financial crises and
the economy rapidly descends into a serious depression. In a depression, hedge
financing becomes dominant again. In this way, the waves of “pessimism” and
“optimism” are repeated sequentially.
The influences of ‘financialization’ on investment, profits, savings and income
distribution from both Keynesian and Kaleckian perspectives have been identi-
fied in recent Post Keynesian analyses [HVT10]. As Gerald A. Epstein points
out, “financialization means the increasing role of financial motives, financial
markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domes-
tic and international economies” [Eps05]. Neoclassical models of financialization
(which include New Classical models established based on endogenous growth
theory and New Keynesian models based on information economics) neglect ef-
fective demand and income distribution conflict between different social groups.
In contrast, the analysis based on Post Keynesian models that incorporate fi-
nancialization [HVT10] conclude that (1) financialization increases bargaining
power of shareholder power in relation to managements and labors, increases the
rate of return on equity and bonds held by rentiers, and decreases managements’
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animal spirits5; (2) financialization increases the potential for wealth-based and
debt-financed consumption; and (3) financialization decreases wage share, and
therefore increases inequality of wages.
3.3 The Effects of Business Cycles on Ecological
Resources
Although business cycles attract the attention of economists’ from different per-
spectives including demand, investment, accumulation of capital, marginal effi-
ciency of capital, the rate of interest, unemployment, accumulation of debt, etc.,
the behavioral effects on over-exploitation of natural resources by business cycles
per se have received relatively less attention.
A simple analogy is given here: because there exist seasonal cycles - spring,
summer, fall, and winter - the needs of energy to heat in winter and to cool in
summer increases the consumption of energy, compared with the situation where
there are no seasonal cycles and the temperature throughout the year is fixed at
the average value.
In direct analogy with the increase in consumption of energy to maintain com-
fortable temperatures, business cycles may increase the consumption of energy,
therefore increasing the production of entropy. An economic boom brings more
demand through stronger investment and consumption, and therefore more usage
of ecological resources relative to a situation where economic growth had stayed
on trend. When macroeconomic fluctuations exist, after the boom there follows
an economic bust, which calls for both government intervention or for free market
policies to help the economy through the recovery of demand or supply. From
the perspective of effective demand, the economic recovery from a low level of
utilization relies on a rising wage share, which boosts output due to the increase
in demand for consumer goods, which is followed by a rise in investment demand
due to enhanced profitability. This recovery process needs more ecological inputs.
In the face of different understandings of the causes of business cycles and
even different viewpoints on the measurement of GDP, and hence business cycles,
5The term animal spirits was first introduced in the field of economics by Keynes (Keynes,
1936), who argued “a large proportion of our positive activities depend on spontaneous opti-
mism rather than mathematical expectations, whether moral or hedonistic or economic. Most,
probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn
out over many days to come, can only be taken as the result of animal spirits - a spontaneous
urge to action rather than inaction.” Animal spirits, therefore, refer to the role of emotional
factors and to the fact that both optimism and pessimism exist. The consequence is that it is
impossible in practise to calculate the mathematical expectations that are best known as fun-
damental uncertainty, but typically assumed by mainstream economists to determine almost
all economic decisions [Qui10].
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a simple model is established to fuse independent entropy production into the
traditional concept of economic output in order to illustrate that, however we
measure the macro-economy and deal with entropy, fluctuations in the macro-
economy will produce an more consumption of natural resources which is reflected
in increase in entropy production.
3.4 The Macroeconomic Causes of Business Cy-
cles
Post Keynesian economists have different explanations for the causes of business
cycles from neoclassical economists partly due to the opposite viewpoint on the
relationship between the microeconomic and macroeconomic systems. As Steve
Keen [Kee01] argued,
Post Keynesians reverse the neoclassical pecking order, to argue
that whatever microeconomics is developed must be consistent with
the observed behavior of the macro-economy. A microeconomic model
which is inconsistent with such things as business cycles, sustained
unemployment, commonplace excess capacity, and the importance of
credit, is to Post Keynesians an invalid model.
A business cycle is a consequence of the fluctuation of aggregate investment.
John Maynard Keynes [Key36] argued that the business cycle originates espe-
cially from investment, which is influenced by the fluctuation of the marginal
efficiency of capital under uncertainty. Micha l Kalecki [Kal43] argued that profit
is a significant variable that influences investment, and emphasized his “princi-
ple of increasing risk”. In other words, increasing investment eventually results
in debt accumulation, which may be unsustainable. Richard Goodwin [Goo67]
argued that the conflicts between labor and capital produce the cyclical em-
ployment and accumulation rate. Hyman Minsky [Min86] argued that financing
investment increases the tendency to swing between pessimism and optimism and
so dampens and encourages investment finance per se. Following these observa-
tions, investment and profit, fundamental uncertainty, effective demand, income
distribution, and financial instability are reviewed.
3.4.1 Investment, Profit and Fundamental Uncertainty
Since profits are savings in the Kaleckian framework, Kalecki takes the view that
investment determines savings while Say’s Law argues that savings determine
investment. If Say’s Law is correct, i.e. profits/savings determine investment at
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the micro level, an insufficiency of investment cannot occur because gaps from
the profits/savings will be filled by the business community through financing.
However, according to Kalecki’s “principle of increasing risk”, the firm’s access
to external capital is largely determined by its internal entrepreneurial capital.
Investment is limited by finance that is in turn inversely affected by the degree
of indebtedness.
Colin Richardson and Peter Romilly [RR08] found that the essence of the
determinants of investment expenditure, in the investment theories of all schools
of economics, is the gap between the rate of profit and the risk-adjusted market
rate of interest. Because the accumulation of capital decreases the rate of profit,
even more investment is required to widen this “profitability gap” and keep up
the demand for investment. On the other hand, investment can be depressed by
the existence of fundamental uncertainty stemming from the fact that there is
no possibility of forecasting the future based on the past by using mathematical
tools. This is because an economy moving through historical time is not “er-
godic” like the timeless physical world, in which experiments can be repeated,
Newton’s planetary orbits are fixed and Einstein’s field equations rule space-time.
According to this framework, capitalists cannot predict the rate of profit, the gap
in the rate of profit, or the expected demand, and ignore what might modify the
environment where they have to take their decisions and invest [Dav91, AGD12].
However, capitalists have to adopt some view about their own future profitabil-
ity, otherwise there would be stasis. In practice, they tend to look to their most
recently realized results as a guide to what they should expect the future will
bring.
Keynes’s fundamental uncertainty cannot be treated like a risk [Dav91, Dav10,
Dav12]. Facing fundamental uncertainty, people rely on convention to make judg-
ments on further investment decisions. Therefore, investors tend to have a short
term horizon and are mainly driven by speculative motives; that is, they are
mainly occupied with forecasting “the psychology of the market” rather than
“the prospective yield of assets over their whole life” [Key36].
Lack of attention to Keynes’s fundamental uncertainty yields biased macroe-
conomic policies. For instance, Amitava Dutt [Dut11] argued the debate between
the opponents of government activity and those who think of government policies
as a panacea is ill conceived, because
government policies may not work as precisely expected, and fre-
quent changes in macroeconomic policy may make the future more
uncertain and create more instability. However, the expectation that
unregulated free markets will solve macroeconomic problems . . . fails
to take into account . . . problems due to the existence of fundamental
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uncertainty and the fact that individual attempts to tame it, cope
with it, and reduce it may not have socially desirable outcomes.
Minimizing fundamental uncertainty needs sustainable effective demand. Ac-
cording to Jerome Levy, in a capitalist economy with external trade in balance,
total profits equal investment, where investment is an independent variable while
profits are dependent [Min89], i.e.
Profits = Investment (3.1)
To expand this to a sophisticated capitalist economy, the profits equation
[Min89] becomes
Profits = Investment
+ Government Deficit
− The Deficit on International Trade
− Savings out of Wages
+ Consumption out of Profits (3.2)
The Levy-Kalecki profits equation [WP03] “. . . demonstrates that profits are
identically equal to investment, plus the government’s deficit, less the current
account deficit, plus consumption out of profits, and less saving out of wages.”
On the left hand side of “identically equal” is “profits”. Yet the business sector
cannot control its own profits, so it must be the right hand side that determines
this aggregate. So, to sustain effective demand, those with power to make larger
investments and increase consumption out of profits (capitalists) should do so.
Likewise, workers should consume more out of their wages and the government
should act to increase its budget deficit, by spending more and/or taxing less.
Action to raise exports and/or lower imports is also indicated at times when
effective demand needs to be sustained.
3.4.2 Effective Demand and Full Employment
Full employment makes effective demand sustainable. John Maynard Keynes
[Key36] pointed out that the economists in the pre-Keynesian era assume that
full employment is reached automatically. That is, there is only one intersec-
tion between the labor demand function and the labor supply function. Effective
demand for goods and services is what drives employment [Kal43], therefore in-
voluntary unemployment is caused by deficient effective demand.
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Effective demand is made up of investment expenditure and consumption
expenditure [Key36, Key37], and is a core concept for understanding macro-
dynamics. According to John Maynard Keynes [Key36], the value of the effective
demand equals the intersected point between the aggregate demand function
and the aggregate supply function, where both functions depend on the level of
employment, as will be discussed in the next section. In order to distinguish from
the pre-Keynesian economic assumption that the aggregate demand will self-
adapt to the changing aggregate supply automatically, John Maynard Keynes
[Key36] also argued that effective demand may not have a unique equilibrium
value.
John Maynard Keynes [Key36] proposed a theory of the determination of em-
ployment and economic output based on the analysis of aggregate demand, rather
than on the analysis of the growth of inputs to production and improvements
in technology. He also proposed that the determination of aggregate demand
depended on consumption demand and investment demand, rather than on ag-
gregate supply, the latter depending on the supply of factors of production, such
as capital and labor, and their productivity. In short, his was not a “supply-side
theory” as promoted by orthodox economists, whose prescriptions for raising em-
ployment include real wage cuts, reduced public sector employment and transfer
payments, lower taxation of corporations/dividends/interest, and increased work
intensity, all of which tend to reduce effective demand.
As for investment demand determinants, Colin Richardson and Peter Romilly
[RR08] examined the equations of investment theories proposed by Adam Smith,
Karl Marx, John Maynard Keynes, Micha l Kalecki, James Tobin, Dale Jorgen-
son, and others, and argued that pre-Keynesian economic uniform profitability,
Keynesian marginal efficiency, accelerator mechanisms, and neoclassical q-theory
and user cost investment functions are specific expressions of a single generic
investment function, i.e. the profitability gap between the profit rate and the
risk-adjusted interest rate. Julio Lopez and Tracy Mott [LM99] pointed out that
Kalecki’s investment theory strengthens Keynes’s investment theory: (1) that
wage cuts in the general case do not increase employment, and (2) that taxation
of capital income can increase the economic well-being of all [LM99]. Nicholas
Kaldor [Kal57] also points out that Keynes used the declining marginal efficiency
of capital function, while Micha l Kalecki used the principle of increasing marginal
risk.
As for consumption demand determinants, John Maynard Keynes [Key36]
introduced a novel analytical tool, i.e. the consumption function. The rationale
for the consumption function is:
the fundamental psychological law, upon which we are entitled
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to depend with great confidence both a priori and from our detailed
knowledge of human nature and from the detailed facts of experience,
is that men are disposed, as a rule and on the average to increase
their consumption as their income increases, but not by as much as
the increase in their income.
Therefore, according to Hyman Minsky [Min08],
the cyclical consumption-income relation embodies an initial sta-
bility of absolute consumption standards, which is followed by an
adjustment toward a longer-run sustained ratio of consumption to
income: the consumption-income ratio adjusts upward as increased
income is sustained and adjusts downward as decreased income is
prolonged.
On the other hand, John Hicks [Hic37] claimed that liquidity preference is
the important difference between Keynes and the Classics and stated that the
equation embodying the consumption function and the multiplier “is a mere sim-
plification and ultimately insignificant”. After four decades, John Hicks clarified
in Journal of Post Keynesian Economics his 1937 model lack of macroeconomic
basis because the model required the assumption that the macro-economy was
always in equilibrium [Hic80].
As for international demand, it is reasonable to translate the net exports ag-
gregate into its wage and profit components to consider its effects on effective
demand. Neoclassical economists insist that increasing net exports following a
decrease in wages has only a positive effect on domestic effective demand: de-
caying wages will improve international competitiveness and therefore ultimately
net exports, furthermore net exports will have a positive effect on investment
due to rising profitability. Lack of any comparison between net export demand
and consumption demand contributes to this simple result. Distinguishing be-
tween economies that are wage-led and profit-led prevents it. In a profit-led
economy, increasing net exports can substitute for decreasing wages more readily
than in a wage-led economy. Robert Blecker [Ble89] introduced net exports into
the demand components in the Kaleckian model, and showed that an increase
in the wage share may lower international price competitiveness and has a neg-
ative impact on investment by assuming that the measure of international price
competition is exogenously given.
The arguments presented above suggest that to achieve full employment better
income distribution is required.
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3.4.3 Income Distribution
Understanding the determinants of income distribution is a central concern of
economics. Income distribution is clearly an important social and political con-
cern, having ramifications for fairness and the social and political stability of
society [Pal06]. The dominant neoclassical approach to income distribution is
marginal productivity theory, which emphasizes demand for factors of produc-
tion and supply. The determination of income distribution is therefore part of
the workings of the price system, according to orthodox economists. They claim
that distribution is determined by competitive market forces that ensure factors
are paid for appropriately to their contribution to production, and the process of
determining factor prices in turn links the determination of factor employment.
Income distribution is a key concept in economic growth theory [Pal06, Dut08,
Lav09b, CLSV10, HVT10, HLVT11, HVT11, Lav11, KS11, Dut12a, NF12, HLVT12,
RS12b, Pal13a, Pal13b, Pal13c]. Income distribution that is appropriate for a
given macroeconomic environment and local ecosystem services will favor eco-
nomic growth and environmental sustainability. A better income distribution
causes weaker economic fluctuations and business cycles, which in turn assist en-
vironmental sustainability through sustainable investments and consumptions in
the long run. In a demand-driven economy, a higher wage share will give workers
the incentives to consume more, but leave more environmental problems and use
more ecosystems services, hence making it harder to maintain the resilience of
ecological systems. However, a higher profit share will give holders of capital
more stimuli to invest in the future, but weaken current consumption. This will
be reflected in lower wages, and then hurt profits in the coming period, thus also
investment for the future at least in the short term. Meanwhile a higher profit
share also can affect macroeconomic stability through financial burdens, once the
expectation of instability takes hold of investors.
A crucial question raised in growth theories that propose that aggregate de-
mand is a major determinant of growth, is how income distribution between
wages and profits affects the economy [Cas12]. Post Keynesian models of eco-
nomic growth propose a central role for income distribution. They emphasize
complex dynamic interactions between growth and income distribution [Dut12a]
through concentrating on the effect on economic growth of income distribution
between wages and profits, and examine whether growth is wage-led (i.e. in-
creases in the wage share increase the rate of growth) or profit-led (i.e. increases
in the profit share increase the rate of growth). The works of Micha l Kalecki
[Kal35, Kal43, Kal62, Kal68] contribute to the theory of the dynamics of eco-
nomic growth and income distribution for economists who take the view that the
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unemployment of resources, such as labor and capital, can persist in the economy
over long periods of time [Dut12b]. In his theoretical work, Micha l Kalecki argues
that the determination of output level and income distribution are merged in a
unique theory, so that “the long-run trend is but a slowly changing component
of a chain of short-period situations; it has no independent entity, and the two
basic relations mentioned above should be formulated in such a way as to yield
the trend cum business-cycle phenomenon” [Kal68]. He also holds that income
distribution is crucially determined by the price setting behavior of oligopolistic
firms, which depends on the degree of competition and on the strength of labor
unions, i.e. “the degree of monopoly power” [Kal71, Dut84, SO04].
Meanwhile, the debate has focused more on the effects of income distribu-
tion than on its determinants. Income distribution has an important impact on
savings. When the paradox of thrift exists in the long, as well as in the short
term, an increase in the saving rate, which is usually intended to cause faster
growth since saving is thought of as sacrificing current consumption for future
consumption6, actually reduces output. This is because an increase in saving im-
plies a reduction in effective demand, and firms react to this by producing fewer
goods. New Keynesian7 economists would agree with this line of reasoning for
the short term. However, the Kaleckian models show that the paradox of thrift
also may hold in the long term, i.e. an increase in the propensity to save reduces
the long-run rate of growth. Although Post Keynesian models emphasize the
consequences of income distribution for growth, they pay much less attention to
how growth and other factors affect income distribution [Dut12a]. Technological
progress affects income distribution as well as employment [SO04]. If there is a
labor-displacing technological change, a shift in income distribution away from
wages toward profits can result in a decline in demand if the marginal propen-
sity of capitalists to consume is lower than the marginal propensity of workers to
consume [For03, For06].
6Current saving flows (made by sacrificing current consumption of consumer goods) are
not necessarily used by investors (in making future consumption goods). If it were true that
more real saving reduces real interest rates, that would tend to raise real investment. However,
interest rates are determined by supply and demand in the money markets. There are no
physical markets where foregone consumption goods can be exchanged for extra investment
goods, at a price called the real interest rate. Real interest rates are computed by dividing
money interest rates by the inflation rate.
7New Keynesian macroeconomics has been absorbed by the neoclassical paradigm and is
referred to in the economics literature as the new neoclassical synthesis, which dominates main-
stream economics.
25
3.4.4 Financial Instability
According to Hyman Minsky [Min86], the fundamental propositions of the finan-
cial instability hypothesis are “capitalist market mechanisms cannot lead to a
sustained, stable price, full-employment equilibrium” and “serious business cy-
cles are due to financial attributes that are essential to capitalism”. Furthermore,
Hyman Minsky [Min86] pointed out that
. . . the financial instability hypothesis stands in sharp contrast to
the neoclassical synthesis, which holds that unless disturbed from out-
side a decentralized market mechanism will yield a self-sustaining,
stable-price, full-employment equilibrium. The difference between the
two views reflects the way in which finance and financial relations are
specified. The financial instability view makes much of the way in
which ownership or operating control of capital assets are financed,
something standard theory ignores. Further, the financial instability
theory points out that happens change as institutions evolve, so that
even though business cycles and financial crises are unchanging at-
tributes of capitalism, the actual path an economy traverses depends
upon institutions, usages, and policies. In the final analysis, history
remains history, although the range of what can happen is limited by
basic economic relations.
Steve Keen [Kee95] established a model of the “financial instability hypoth-
esis” based on Goodwin’s limit cycle model, i.e. the tendency of capitalists to
incur debt on the basis of euphoric expectations; the importance of long term
debt; the destabilizing impact of income inequality; and the stabilizing effect of
government. This Goodwin-Minsky-Keen model demonstrates the prediction of
Minsky’s hypothesis, i.e. that expectations of profit during economic booms may
lead profit-earners to incur more debt than the system’s capacity of financing
allows; and that debt-induced depression can induce an economic breakdown. In
his model, Keen introduced the concept of complexity to Minsky’s “financial in-
stability hypothesis” by modeling the rate of change of real wages, net investment,
capitalists debt use to finance investment, the rate of change of output, the rate
of change of employment, the rate of change of the employment rate, the rate of
change of workers’ share of output, the rate of change of the debt ratio, and the
rate of change of bankers share in a dynamical system environment. In the part
of economic policy, Keen continued his model with Minksian government to sta-
bilize an unstable economy by introducing the variables on government behavior,
i.e. the rate of change of government spending, the rate of change of taxation,
the rate of change of capitalist debt, and the rate of change of government debt.
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3.5 The Model
In ecology, a basic system describing the dynamics of the relationship between a
single prey species and a predator species is the Lotka-Volterra equations [Hol73,
ML75, Lev92, Dro01, KF11, DB12]
dx
dt
= (A−By)x, A,B > 0, (3.3a)
dy
dt
= (Cx−D)y, C,D > 0, (3.3b)
where x is the population of the prey, and y is the population of the predators,
and A, B, C, D are system-dependent constants. The prey population, x, grows
exponentially in the absence of y, but is reduced for non-zero y as a result of
predation on x. The predator population, y, depends for sustenance entirely on
prey, x, and decreases as the value of x decreases. With reduced pressure from the
predator, the x population begins to grow until it again represents a significant
food source to y. Thus the y population grows until it has over-depleted x and
then decays, and so the cycle continues. Although the Lotka-Volterra equations
are highly simplified and somewhat unrealistic (e.g., the exponential growth in
prey in the absence of predators), they prove instructive, and with modification
are very useful [KF11]. Scaling x, y, and t, the equations can be simplified to
dx
dt
= (1− y)x, (3.4a)
dy
dt
= α(x− 1)y, α > 0, (3.4b)
where α is a system-dependent constant to replace the constants A, B, C, and
D in Lotka-Volterra equations above. Hence α can be viewed as a characteristic
of any given system that follows the Lotka-Volterra equations.
In economics, Richard Goodwin introduced the Lotka-Volterra equations to
represent the dynamical links between the employment rate and the income dis-
tribution [Goo67]. The Goodwin equations have become important tools for
macrodynamic analysis recently [RJ09, VHT11, RJ11b, RJ11a, GCL12]. In his
recent work, Post Keynesian Perspectives and Complex Ecologic-Economic Dy-
namics, J. Barkley Rosser, Jr. concluded the Goodwin equations in the form
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below [RJ11b]
dλ
dt
= λ
(
1− ω
ν
− α− β
)
(3.5a)
dω
dt
= ω(P (λ)− α) (3.5b)
where ω is the wage share, given by the ratio of wage to output, λ is the rate
of employment, given by the ratio of employed workers to the size of the la-
bor force, P (λ) describes a linear Phillips curve relation [AD11, LK07] between
the rate of employment and the rate of change of wages, ν is the capital-output
ratio, the accelerator relation α is the rate of technological change, and β is
the rate of labor force growth. J. Barkley Rosser, Jr. correctly considers the
implications of complex ecological economic dynamics from a Post Keynesian
perspective, and argues that non-linear, catastrophic, chaotic, and other complex
dynamics reinforce the conceptual foundations of the Keynesian notion of uncer-
tainty, and links predator-prey models to Post Keynesian macro-dynamic models
[RJ01, RJ09, RJ11b].
The Goodwin equations can be interpreted as implying that as the employ-
ment rate begins to increase, the wage share increases, and that means the profit
share diminishes. Hence profit diminishes in the short run, investment decreases,
then the employment rate decays. And vice versa, as the employment rate be-
gins to reduce, the wage share decays, and that means the profit share increases.
Hence profit rises in the short run, investment grows, and then the employment
rate increases.
The motivation for Goodwin’s theory is the pre-Keynesian economic assump-
tions that saving is determined by investment and that profits provide all the
saving in the economy. Since first introduced by Richard Goodwin, his version of
the equations has been interpreted in terms of other scenarios [Fla09], including
the Keynesian view of effective demand as the prime economic driver, substitut-
ing for the pre-Keynesian view of saving-driven investment [FM11]. This theory
describes the economy in terms of interactions between the degree of capacity
utilization and income distribution.
Following the Keynesian tradition of effective demand, and emphasizing the
dynamics of entropy, a simple model is developed by assuming that entropy pro-
duction8 is determined by only two factors : the waste arising from capital stock
8In a steady state economy, the dissipation of capital stocks has to be compensated for, which
raises the question to qualify entropy produced for this compensation [KM01]. Unfortunately,
no reliable quantitative estimates of the stock size have been available yet, and there is none
of the dissipation rate. We here avoid introducing the measurement of the system for capital
stock, but focus on the idle capacity which produces the loss of efficiency of the system and
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and the waste from labor stock. The capital waste is seen as the gap between full
and actual utilization of capacity, while the labor waste is seen as the unemploy-
ment rate, i.e. the gap between full and actual employment of available labor,
that is
∂
(
dE
dt
)/
∂x > 0 (3.6a)
∂
(
dE
dt
)/
∂y < 0 (3.6b)
where E is the stock of entropy, with the unemployed labor x and the employed
capacity y being given by Equations (3.4). During economic prosperity, once
employment begins to grow (thus increasing incentives), because output is still
at a higher level in short run, the utilized capacity rises. During an economic
recession, due to extensive unemployment and a decaying wage share, insufficient
consumption demand brings with it increasing underutilized capacity. During an
economic depression, saving increases but investment and consumption decay, so
unutilized capacity continues to increase. During economic recovery, profit begins
to grow and hence so does investment, causing unemployed labor to diminish and
utilization to eventually fall.
Furthermore, in order to reflect the relationship between the unemployment,
the utilization of capacity, and the production of entropy, we specify Equations
(3.4) and (3.6) into
dE
dt
=
x
y
(3.7)
and α ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10}. Given initial value x0 = 2, y0 = 1, and E0 = 10, time span
t ∈ [0, 20]. The equations were solved using the Runge-Kutta method9 with 5th
order truncation error to estimate the local error in the 4th order Runge-Kutta
method to choose the appropriate step size.
3.6 Results
This section shows the solutions of Equations (3.4) and Equations (3.6) under
the combination given by Equation (3.7). Since the introduction of α in order
to scale and simplify the Lotka-Volterra system, it is expected that the variable
needs more compensation that produces the extra entropy.
9The Runge-Kutta method will evaluate the right-hand function using a greater number of
points, essentially seeking to compute the slope at the current and future points in an effort to
improve the accuracy of the prediction [BGP09].
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Figure 3.1: Unemployment rate over time for different values of the technol-
ogy growth rate. The variable representing the unemployment exhibits fixed-
amplitude periodic motions with different frequency according to different values
of α.
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representing unemployment has a fixed-amplitude periodic motion with different
frequency according to different values of α. Hence, a lower value of α produces a
less frequent motion. The variable representing the utilization of capacity is also a
vibration with increasing amplitude and rising frequency accompanying a bigger
value of α. Hence, a lesser value of α produces a lower amplitude and frequent
motion. The variable representing the production of entropy is an increasing
function despite the rate of growth depending on the value of α where a smaller
α means a slower growth.
Figure 3.1 displays the different examples of the dynamics of unemployment
for different values of the rate of technological change, α. A lower value of α
produces a less frequent motion.
Figure 3.2 shows the effects of different values of the rate of technological
change, α, on the dynamics of capacity utilization. A lower value of α produces
a smaller amplitude and less frequent motion.
The relationship between unemployment and capacity utilization is given by
Equations (3.4) and shown in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.2: The effect of rate of technology growth on capacity utilization. The
variable representing the utilization of capacity is also a vibration with increasing
amplitude and rising frequency accompanying a larger value of α.
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Figure 3.3: Unemployment versus capacity utilization for different rates of tech-
nology growth. The variable representing the production of entropy is an increas-
ing function despite the rate of growth depending on the value of α.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Unemployment
Ut
iliz
at
io
n
32
Figure 3.4: The stock of entropy production and its dependence on the technology
growth rate. A higher amplitude cycle is generated by a bigger value of α.
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Figure 3.4 shows the dependency of the entropy stock on the rate of techno-
logical change, α. A smaller α means a slower growth.
As shown in the figures, larger and more frequent fluctuations in the economy
lead to more entropy. That means, given different scenarios of unemployment
and utilization of capacity for the macro-economy, different production levels of
entropy are induced, where larger value of α defined in Equations (3.4) represents
more frequent fluctuation in unemployment, and larger amplitude and more fre-
quent fluctuation in utilization of capacity, and leads to more entropy production.
Therefore mitigation of business cycles on either amplitude or frequency can in-
crease the efficiency of the system, hence weakening the production of entropy.
3.7 Conclusion and Discussion
The inclusion of entropy production as a concept relevant to business cycles is a
significant contribution that has the potential to promote a broader understand-
ing in many areas at the interface of economics and ecology. However, it has
not received attention, despite economists’ interest in the effects and causes of
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business cycles, and the development of explanations according to different eco-
nomic schools of thought [Zar85], as well as the contributions from ecology to the
concept of entropy production and maximum entropy theory in natural systems
[MB10]. This is because of the challenge of linking the underlying mechanisms
of the impacts of business cycles on entropy production. Entropy production
can be thought of as a natural phenomenon associated with economic and hu-
man activities which can reflect the requirement of energy or useful work [AW05]
for economic growth. However, the interdependency between entropy production
and the energy requirement for economic development is unclear. The Goodwin
equations relating wage share and unemployment [Goo67] and its recent appli-
cation to the relationship between capacity utilization and income distribution
[RJ11b] provide an opportunity to incorporate the concept of entropy production
in a description of economic cycles. The modification of the Goodwin equations
using the rate of capacity utilization and the rate of unemployment is based on
the understanding of energy wastages, i.e. that insufficient utilization of existing
capital and under-full employment are two economic wastages that contribute
the unnecessary energy demands. The major task then becomes building the
relationship between entropy production and the rate of capacity utilization and
the relationship between entropy production and the rate of unemployment, then
developing an acceptable paradigm of entropy production via an equation reflect-
ing path dependency. This is a difficult problem to solve, since large amounts of
data would be required in order to discover the possible interdependency between
these three variables. However, different understandings on entropy production
make the process controversial and challenging.
The main achievement of this section is to seek a simple and acceptable
method of integrating entropy production into the macroeconomic dynamic sys-
tem to review the effects of macroeconomic activities on entropy and then to
address the problem of forecasting entropy produced by business cycles. In gen-
eral, predicting the entropy produced by business cycles is an extremely difficult
problem, and it is necessary to focus on a relatively well understood explanation
of business cycles. A simple scaling ratio between unemployed labor and underuti-
lized capacity is chosen. We have detailed the basic principle of a Lotka-Volterra
equations-based prediction of dynamics in ecological-economic applications. We
have also demonstrated, using the Runge-Kutta method with 5th order trunca-
tion error to estimate local error in the 4th order Runge-Kutta method to choose
the appropriate step size, that our business cycles approach can indeed fully con-
struct the path dependency of entropy production and dynamics, based on which
the recognition of capacity utilization and employment can be anticipated.
The results of this chapter suggest that extended Lotka-Volterra equations
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can be useful in understanding the impact of business cycles on the entropy
production and the essential path dependency of entropy.
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Chapter 4
A River Basin Economy
A river basin is generally defined as the area drained by a river and its tributaries
where surface run-off collects, often comprising sub-basins of drainage divisions.
River basin economics used to be a branch of regional economics1, having links to
geography, urban and regional planning, environmental science, political science,
sociology, and other disciplines.
The Murray-Darling basin has a highly volatile climate and drought conditions
are common. For example, the “Federation drought” (1895-1902) was associated
with dry conditions covering most of the eastern two-thirds of Australia, and
the average annual inflow was only 5.4 billion m3 [CC08, WLW+11]. From 1937
to 1945, south-eastern Australia was subjected to another multi-year drought,
known as the “World War II drought” [BD05, VKK09, GLLO10, WLW+11].
Since 1997 a large part of southern Australia was gripped by the most severe
drought ever, the so-called “Big Dry”, a prolonged dry period in Australia that
did not break until 2009 [WLW+11, MW05]. Increases in Australia’s average
temperature of 0.7 degree Celsius from 1910 to 1999, with the largest increases
occurring since about 1950 [QSCK10], are consistent with global trends ascribed
to climate change, and the observed warming in the basin fits this projection.
An enhanced greenhouse effect is likely to have an influence on increasingly dry
conditions in the basin. At the very least, a rise in temperature will exacerbate
the dry conditions during ongoing drought [MT08]. Historical data provided by
the Bureau of Meteorology, Figure 4.1 shows, respectively, an annual rainfall
anomaly2 [Bur13c] and maximum temperature anomaly [Bur13a] over the period
1911-2010. The natural environment of the Murray-Darling basin has experi-
enced increasing maximum temperatures and decreasing rainfall, particularly in
1Recent examples include a regional model, Climate and Regional Economics of Development
(CRED) [ASB13], and a dynamic multi-regional computable general equilibrium model, The
Enormous Regional Model (TERM) [QSQP09, WG11].
2The time series anomaly is a new time series that describes the difference between the
original series and its average.
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Figure 4.1: Annual rainfall and maximum temperature in the Murray-Darling
basin from 1910 to present
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the most recent decade. According to the Year Book Australia 2012 [Aus12],
temperatures were relatively stable until 1950, and since then have followed an
increasing trend.
Australia’s average population growth rate for the period 1911-2010 was 1.61%
annually, and total population has grown nearly 5 times from less than 4.5 mil-
lion to more than 22 million. Figure 4.2 displays this trend using data from the
Australian Historical Population Statistics [Aus13b] till 1991 and Australian De-
mographic Statistics [Aus13a] from 1992 onwards. Starting from mid 1970s the
growth rate became relatively stable.
Australia’s average GDP growth rate for the period 1911-2010 was 7.79%
annually, and total current prices GDP has grown nearly 1,820 times from less
than 685 million to more than 1240 billion. Figure 4.3 provides a time series for
GDP over the period 1911-2010. As comparable time series are not available for
the whole period, four overlapping data sets are shown for each aggregate. The
first three data sets covering the period of 1911-1960 are taken from the Year
Book Australia 2001 [Aus01]. The fourth data set covering the period 1960-2010
is taken from the 2011-2012 issue of the Australian System of National Accounts
[Aus13d]. Although there are conceptual and methodological differences between
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Figure 4.2: Historical population and its growth in Australia from 1910 to present
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the estimates for the various time periods, it provides the best available time
series for the Australian GDP over the last 100 years.
Figure 4.4 provides the time series for wage share, i.e. the share of compen-
sation of employees in GDP over the period 1960-2010, and the time series for
unemployment rate over the period 1978-2010. The wage share has fluctuated
throughout the last 50 years with several peaks and troughs. In 1960, the wage
share stood at 46.6%, and increased to 52.2% in 1972, before rapidly reaching a
peak of 57.2% in 1975. This high wage share persisted for four years, before it
fell rapidly to below 53.3% by 1979. It then increased again, reaching a peak of
55% in 1983. The wage share has been generally falling since then. In 1988, the
wage share stood at 49.7%, and fluctuated at around this rate until 2010. The
rate of unemployment also has fluctuated throughout the last 30 years with two
peaks. In the early 1980s, the unemployment rate increased rapidly from around
5.2% to a peak of 10%. It then decreased to 6% at the end of the 1980s before it
rose rapidly to above 10.6% by 1992. It then decreased again, reaching a lower
level of 4.2% in 2007 before it increased again to above 5.7%.
Under a panoramic, yet fragmentary and fuzzy, view of Australian macro-
economy and ecosystem services in the Murray-Darling basin, the chapter pro-
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Figure 4.3: Historical GDP in Australia from 1910 to present
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ceeds as follows. Section 4.1 presents a description of previous models of the
economy of river basins following two contrasting approaches, i.e. a bottom-
up micro-based price-oriented approach, and a top-down macro-based policy-
oriented approach. It also includes a review of the comparison for these two kinds
of approaches. Section 4.2, section 4.3, and section 4.4 present the agent-based
models for micro land/water users, for micro food consumers, and the model for
the system-based macro-economy, respectively. Section 4.5 describes the frame-
work for the Murray-Darling Basin Economy Simulation Model as a summary for
further modeling in the next sections. Then, section 4.6 and section 4.7 describe
the results for estimation of parameters, interpret these estimates and the results
for calibration. Section 4.8 describes the forecasting results. Section 4.9 discusses
the findings and concludes.
4.1 Methodology and Previous Literature
Neoclassical environmental/ecological economic arguments propose numerous an-
alytic methods to calculate the cost of ecosystem services in order to approach
economic optimization and sustainable development. These include
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Figure 4.4: Historical wage share and unemployment rate in Australia from 1960
to present
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(1) economic and financial valuation, including willingness-to-pay (WTP),
determined from the estimated economic value for the use of ecosystem services
[VMM+05, PVASPV08, GTEMH+12, Pin12], the polluter pays principle (PPP)
that ensures those who use society’s scarce natural resources compensate the
public for their use [CO92, Ayr08], and individual transferable quotas (ITQs)
which are a measure of capacity and reflect the level of investment on the basis
of history [Bro00, BSH09, HHFT12];
(2) a free market approach that assumes that competitive equilibrium auto-
matically exists and persists indefinitely [Arr62, MZ74];
(3) the institution of private property, which is said to incentivize humans
to make a system more “perfect” in the sense of efficiency of use [Har68, Qui93,
Das96, Bro00];
(4) central government-based conservation that controls and allocates natural
resources [BO95]; and
(5) economic growth that follows the so-called environmental Kuznets curve
(EKC) which asserts that pollution follows an inverted-U path with respect to
economic growth, and once the economy grows beyond the peak pollution rate,
environmental health will be restored or repaired automatically, now that the
population has grown rich enough to care about the environment they daily in-
habit and make political demands for its restoration to a more pristine state
[GK94, Ste04, Ayr08].
Once concentrating on river basin water management and river basin econ-
omy, an integrated hydro-economic model3 captures the complexity of interac-
tions between water and the economy [BH08, PVASPV08, GJ11, KNBJ11]. For
example, such a model should be a fundamental tool for assessing management
and infrastructure strategies to improve the economic efficiency of water use in
the context of competition over scarce water resources. Such a model can repro-
duce the physical behavior of the system, with a realistic representation of the
different surface and groundwater resources, including their interaction, and the
spatial and temporal variability of resource availability. Such a model might also
incorporate the value of water for different urban, agricultural and industrial uses
and users.
Two main approaches are distinguished: bottom-up approaches which explic-
itly specify options for water usage, food production and food consumption using
3As we focus on an integrated ecological-economic system, we will not attempt to cover
hydrological models alone. Famous models include the micro-scale Integrated Quantity and
Quality simulation Model (IQQM) for water resource and salinity management [SPC96], macro-
scale hydrological models based on future climate change [CDP+10], water trading [DKH+12],
and water footprint [HM12]. An excellent historical review on hydrological modeling has been
given by [Sil06]. An excellent review on catchment water balance modeling in Australian history
is provided by [Bou05].
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both ecological and economic parameters; and top-down approaches which rather
are oriented to analyzing the causality relationships and possible interdependen-
cies between macroeconomic variables. In the following paragraph, we survey
previous studies that have incorporated endogenous technological growth4.
4.1.1 Sustainability: Weak versus Strong
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO),
sustainability means “ensuring human rights and well-being without depleting or
diminishing the capacity of the earth’s ecosystems to support life, or at the ex-
pense of others’ well-being”. Similarly, according to the Report of the World
Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future [Wor87],
sustainable development is a type of “development that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs”. Although people have descriptions of sustainability and sustainable de-
velopment like these [Ste97, SP00, ADM03, BV03, ADG+04, Tai06, PS09, Hea11,
DQB11, RCC11, BAB+12], the meaning of the terms “sustainability” and “sus-
tainable development” has remained unclear and diluted. Therefore, the notion
of sustainability has become extremely wide.
As a descriptive concept, sustainability comes in two varieties, weak and
strong: We are weakly sustainable if what we are doing will let future generations
achieve our living standards or better, or if we aren’t compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their needs, which is the core of the World Commission
on Environment and Development definition. We are strongly sustainable if all
forms of life on our planet can be sustained regardless of any economic trade-offs.
To be more precise, weak sustainability [SERB03, Sch09] requires that for eco-
nomic growth to be considered sustainable, the total aggregate stock of capital,
both physical and natural, should not decline over time. In other words, even
if there is an environmental drag created by pollution and resource exploitation,
or more broadly the reduction of natural capital, economic growth may still be
sustainable provided that the level of physical (and other) capital increases at
least as quickly as natural capital is depleted. By contrast, strong sustainability,
according to Herman Daly [Dal96, DF03], would require maintaining both hu-
manly created and natural capital intact separately, on the assumption that they
are complements rather than substitutes in most production functions.
4We do not attempt in this section to provide an entirely exhaustive survey of all bottom-up
and top-down studies accomplished. Instead, the studies reviewed here represent a consid-
erable number of important methodological developments in the hydro-economic field, which
together permit emphasizing the most important conclusions to retain from large-scale models
incorporating water usage.
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4.1.2 Micro-scale Analysis: Inevitably Optimizing
For advocates of complete substitution (zero complements) between capitals, or
for advocates of partial substitution (partial complements), or for advocates of
zero substitution (complements only), optimization is a direct approach.
Particularly for substitution advocates, Harold Hotelling’s pioneering paper
The Economics of Exhaustible Resources5 provides their preferred model of opti-
mal depletion [Hot31]. For example, the model of optimal growth theory [Arr09]
defines a net price6 path as a function of time, while maximizing rent as the full
extraction of a non-renewable natural resource is approached [RCC11]. It estab-
lishes that a necessary condition for the efficient intergenerational allocation of
exhaustible resources is that the price of an exhaustible resource should increase
at the world interest rate (including a risk premium). Microeconomic bottom-up
approaches to environmental economics typically apply agent-based modeling to
problems of ecological resource usage.
In a typical resource management scenario, an initial stock of natural resource
K0 is to be exploited over a period t ∈ [0, T ], where t is the running time and T
is the end of the period which may or may not be predetermined. At any instant
of time the remaining stock K(t) is given and the exploitation rate q(t) generates
the instantaneous benefit u(K(t), q(t), t) and changes K(t) according to
d
dt
K = G(K(t), q(t), t) (4.1)
where G(K(t), q(t), t) represents the natural resource flow (e.g., growth, replen-
ishment). If we denote Γ as the set of all feasible policies, an exploitation policy
{T, q(t), t ∈ [0, T ]} generates an economic payoff∫ T
0
u(K(t), q(t), t)e−ρtdt+ e−ρTv(K(T )) (4.2)
where ρ is the rate of discount over time and v(K(T )) is the post-planning value
(the present value at time T of the benefit stream over the post-planning period
t > T ). The policy is feasible if it satisfies some given constraints on T and on
{T, q(t), t ∈ [0, T ]}, e.g., T is given or restricted to a certain range, and the stock
K(t) is positive or bounded in some range and q(t) ≤ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. The
optimal policy is the feasible policy that maximizes (4.2) subject to (4.1) given
5The formulation of the resource management problem considers exhaustible (non-
renewable) resources and characterized optimal extraction policies in different market settings,
using the calculus of variations to verify economic reasoning. The development of optimal
control and dynamic programming methods opened the way for a wide range of extensions,
including the incorporation of uncertainty of various kinds and forms.
6Net price is defined as the difference between price and marginal extraction cost [Hot31,
Sol74, HK13].
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K(0) = K0. The value of (4.2) obtained under the optimal policy is denoted
V (K0,Γ) and is called the value function.
4.1.3 Macro-scale Analysis: Three Roads Lead to Two
Sustainabilities
In macroeconomic top-down approaches to sustainable development, ecological
and environmental economists prefer using neoclassical theory7 which includes
New Classical economic growth theory [Arr62, Luc88, AH90, Rom91, Rom94,
MRW92] and New Keynesian economic growth theory [Sol56, GS88, Man89,
MRW92, Rom93]. In his paper The Economics of the Environment, Partha Das-
gupta [Das96] highlights that “macroeconomic models involving long-run pro-
duction and consumption possibilities typically make no mention of the environ-
mental resource-base; the implicit assumption being that natural resources aren’t
scarce now, and won’t be scarce in the future.” For instance, Robert Solow in his
frequently-cited paper A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth [Sol56]
assumes that “there is no scarce nonaugmentable resource”, and this contributed
to the later New Keynesian economic growth theory. Furthermore, in the popular
aggregate production function, natural resources are seen as one kind of capital in-
put, making (constant) elasticity of substitution a suitable assumption underlying
the smooth curve displaying trade-offs between numerous labor-capital combina-
tion technologies. Technological progress is assumed to be exogenous, lifting the
production function to higher levels as “logical time” passes [Sol57]. In his paper
On the Mechanics of Economic Development, Robert Lucas [Luc88] also states
that
there are two kinds of capital . . . in the system: physical capi-
tal that is accumulated and utilized in production under a familiar
neoclassical technology, and human capital that enhances the pro-
ductivity or both labor and physical capital, and that is accumulated
according to a law having the crucial property that a constant level
of effort produces a constant growth rate of the stock, independent of
the level already attained.
7A survey of the literature on development theory covering from 1940s to mid 1960s has been
given [HM64], while the literature on development involving both exogenous and endogenous
factors from the mid 1950s to 1990 is reviewed [SIM90a, SIM90b]. For modern macroeconomic
analysis, three competing approaches exist [Nig06] in contemporary macroeconomics: New
Classical Economics, based on the neoclassical notion of an inherently self-regulating economy
characterized by steady growth and requiring minimal government intervention; Post Keynesian
Economics, in which the economy is characterized by chronic unemployment and instability
problems and an uneven growth process requiring systematic government intervention; and New
Keynesian Economics, in which occasional episodes of instability require periodic government
intervention and government policy can affect the endogenous growth rate.
45
In this way, Robert Lucas replaces exogenous technical progress developed by
Robert Solow with a kind of endogenous progress due to human capital accumu-
lation.
Contrary to mainstream environmental macroeconomic claims, in recent times
ecological economists8 propose a-growth theory and degrowth theory [Kal11,
KKMA12, VDBK12], which suggest that preventing environmental degradation
and unsustainability needs technological progress or economic degrowth. As for
the degrowth scenario, individuals do face a strict condition of “to profit or to die”,
but not the economy in aggregate. Yet individuals at the micro scale can continue
to profit, even if the overall macro-economy shrinks, because profit does not re-
quire expansion, and individuals can make profits in multiple ways other than by
increasing production [Law11]. Furthermore ecological macro-economists argue
that governments need to set social and environmental limits first (a throughput
cap and a job guarantee) and then capitalism does what it does best [Law11], i.e.
allocate resources to competing needs through the price mechanism. In economies
with capped resources, the most innovative firms will adapt, maintaining profits
through qualitative changes and shifting to less resource-intensive production.
Caps will reduce resource use to a steady state, “greener” sectors and firms
will grow and accumulate, and “blacker” or “browner” sectors will disappear.
Whether a green capitalism is possible can be judged by comparing three schools
in ecological economics [Law11], i.e. the steady-state school, green-growth school
and anti-growth school. In the progress of building the growth paths, the core
has always been an ecological production function that represents the production
of ecosystem services. This is conceptually analogous to the standard production
function used in neoclassical economics to describe how inputs are combined to
produce intermediate or final outputs [PS09], and that a balanced local ecologi-
cal production function would necessarily include solar energy, nutrients, air (or
oxygen) and water as factors, along with living organisms (biomass) as capital
[Ayr04].
The rest of this subsection will focus on three macroeconomic approaches for
analysis, and two distinct concepts of sustainability. Table 4.1 shows all relevant
references.
8In 2012 a special issue on “environment, sustainability and heterodox economics” in Cam-
bridge Journal of Economics displays the variety within heterodox approaches to environmental
sustainability. For example, in order to test for the existence of differences in terms of method-
ological and ideological approaches, a classification of work in the field of environmental policy
is introduced [SR12].
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Table 4.1: Three roads lead to two sustainabilities
Weak Sustainability Strong Sustainability
New Classical [FS11, Heu12, HF13, HK13,
HR13, Bar13]
[HI09, Dou12, BD12]
New Keynesian [HGDH08, Qui09,
HHFT12, Qui13]
[Dal91, Hey00, Law03,
Sim06, KK12]
Post Keynesian [For03, For06, RCC11,
SD13]
[Kro10, RTM13, SRM13,
SBA13]
Environmental Macroeconomics concerns the study and design of environ-
mental policy following the definition of weak sustainability. In comparison, Eco-
logical Macroeconomics concerns the study and design of environmental policy
following the principle of strong sustainability.
New Classical Macroeconomics [FS11, Heu12, HF13, HK13, HR13] incorpo-
rates pollution into a standard real business cycle framework that develops the
model to address questions about the relationship between environmental policies,
macroeconomic fluctuations, and endogenous technological growth that stresses
the importance of path dependency in environmental technology policy. The
standard real business cycle model is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model that has an individual representative consumer who optimizes
consumption, leisure, and saving over his or her entire lifetime, and a single rep-
resentative firm that optimizes capital and labor inputs over its entire lifetime.
There are exogenous business cycles that provide shocks to the total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP), and these affect the returns to inputs and therefore prices in
general equilibrium. Consumers and firms respond rationally to these cyclical
changes. The standard endogenous growth model assumes persistent growth is
obtained by transforming labor from a scarce resource to a fully reproducible
factor by interpreting it as human capital.
New Keynesian Macroeconomics [Rom93] recognizes some imperfections in
the process of economic adjustment, contrary to New Classical Macroeconomics,
whose theory of efficient markets essentially recognizes none. However, like the
New Classical approach, New Keynesian macroeconomic analysis usually assumes
that households and firms have rational expectations, i.e. it applies a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that has a representative consumer
and a representative firm optimizing as explained above. The New Keynesian
approach asserts that price rigidities can prevent market clearing, so that excess
supplies and demands are the result of a lack of price and wage flexibility.
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Post Keynesian economics9 has concentrated primarily on the issues of unem-
ployment from an historical macroeconomic perspective. Post Keynesians have
highlighted the theory of effective demand and its consequences - spending drives
macroeconomic performance, an economy can experience prolonged bouts of high
unemployment, and economic policies are necessary to assure full employment,
low inflation, and stable financial markets. Unlike most New Classical and New
Keynesian macroeconomic models, Post Keynesian economists do not view the
existence of unemployment as a temporary problem that will be solved in the
long run once wages, prices, and interest rates are sufficiently flexible; they see
unemployment as a problem that will not disappear unless effective macroeco-
nomic policies are used to create jobs. While the New Classical economics and
New Keynesian economics view interest rates as equilibrating savings and in-
vestment, hence leading to more spending and growth even though demand can
be inadequate, Post Keynesian economists hold that history is more important
than equilibrium, and that investment is driven by historical profitability gaps
and hence “animal spirits”. Most New Classical and New Keynesian macroeco-
nomic models assume that demand adjusts automatically to increases in supply
or productive capacity, and that long-run growth is thus determined by supply
constraints - resources are insufficient or the usages of resources are inefficient.
Post Keynesian macroeconomic models, in contrast, highlight growth as being
demand-led - wage-led or profit-led. First, demand affects the utilization of pro-
ductive resources, such as the increase of labor force participation which increases
output and makes firms more willing to adopt new technologies, and the increase
of utilization of capacity which saves natural resources. Second, demand influ-
ences the ability to produce goods in the future and thus the living standards of
future generations.
4.2 Food Production
This section covers the simulation model for land/water users (agricultural agents),
i.e. food producers. For the entire subsystem, capital stock is detailed and dis-
tinguished from agent to agent, while the cost of wages (or wage bill) is seen as
a whole, therefore, wage-earners are not distinguished. Each agricultural agent,
facing exogenous impacts on water availability from climate change, chooses an
investment strategy depending on the feedback from the profit of food in order
to increase water efficiency to some extent, which then affects the production of
9Post Keynesian Macroeconomics, according to Steve Keen [Kee13], is distinguished from
New Classical Macroeconomics and New Keynesian Macroeconomics in six key areas: the role
of equilibrium, the nature of expectations, the need for micro-foundations, the model of pro-
duction, the role of money, and the role of government.
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food. Meanwhile, the interaction between agents takes place through the rank
for each agent, which determines their capital stocks, and the production costs
which affect food profit.
Capital stock is determined by the rank of the agents that is variable in time,
and the number of agents which also is a dynamical variable along with the ex-
ogenous environment’s changes. Capital stock also depends on investment, which
is an input flow that adds to capital stock. Water efficiency is a linear function
of capital stock, and furthermore determines food production along with water
availability, which is a combined consequence of exogenous climate change and
endogenous water efficiency. The potential influence of climate change on capital
stock is included as a fusion of the concept of strong sustainability where climate
change is assumed to reduce the capacity of flow of capital that is independent
of human activities. This assumption highlights complementarity rather than
substitution between natural capital and human-made capital.
Investment, on the one hand, is determining the capital stock over a given
period; and on the other hand, depends on the rate of profit that is defined as
the ratio between the profit and the current capital stock. Profit from food is
simplified as turnover less cost of food sold, where food turnover depends on the
exogenous mark-up rate, i.e. higher food cost means higher food turnover for a
given agent. The wage bill is simply determined by the difference between the
value of total agricultural output and total profit.
4.2.1 Expenditure and Revenue
The process from food production to food consumption is simplified. Producers
buy means of production (physical, non-human inputs) and human inputs at
given input prices and wages, then sell the food products with a mark-up on cost
of production (output price). The rate of mark-up is endogenously determined
by the distribution of income in the macroeconomic system.
Given M agents, for the jth agent (j = 1, 2, . . . ,M), the expenditure of food
production E for a unit in a period dt follows decreasing capital expenditure
to scale of capital stock K, e.g. buying equipment, and increasing operational
expenditure to scale [Kal71], e.g. salaries and benefits for employees, i.e.
∂Ej
∂Kj
= α1 − α2 (4.3)
where Kj is capital stock for jth agent, and all αs are positive parameters, here
α1 is the rate at which the more capital stock adds the larger operational expen-
diture, while α2 is the rate at which more capital stock saves the larger capital
expenditure. The revenue of food production Rj marks up the food expenditure
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by a rate of mark-up m that is determined by an amount based on income distri-
bution [Kal68, Har74, Ble89, BM90, Ste99], then for food produced by ith agent,
the food price per unit (also known as food revenue per unit sold) is determined
by
Rj = (1 +m)Ej (4.4)
where the food revenue is always marked up to food expenditure at a given rate
in production. This is also our micro pricing equation where price equilibrium
may exist, but also may never be stable.
4.2.2 Capital, Profit and Investment
Capital consists of six categories, i.e. productive, infrastructure, human, financial,
social, and natural. According to Colin Richardson and Peter Romilly [RR08],
capital is accumulated by firms in the production and finance sectors, by house-
holds and governments, and hence by the economy as a whole. In order to
highlight the effect of capital accumulation on the whole economy, it is assumed
here that there are only two kinds of capital, the first is the capital which can be
accumulated, e.g. infrastructure and productive capital, the second is the capital
which cannot be accumulated straightaway, but contributes to technical progress
or efficiency that may enhance the capacity of capital accumulation, e.g. human
capital, social capital and/or natural capital. Given time t, the stock of the cap-
ital of the first kind Kj is assumed to follow Zipf’s law
10 [Axt01, New05, YRJ09]
Kj = K1
(
1− log j
logM
)
(4.5)
where K1 is the capital stock for the biggest food producer at time t. In the
subsystem, for a given agent j may not identify her. In essence, j is an index
to identify the distance with the biggest producer to jth producer by measuring
capital stock, i.e. the index can change from time to time. Similarly, the biggest
food producer can change as well in the subsystem, and so can the number of
food producers. The output for the jth agent can be
Yj = Dj × (Rj − Ej) = mEjDj (4.6)
where Dj is the amount of food production which is determined physically by
water supply and food-water efficiency, i.e. Dj = hj ×Hj.
Applying the profitability-investment equation [RR08, RCC11] to build the
10Although Zipf’s Law initially describes the principle of relative frequency in language
[Zip49], George Kingsley Zipf applied it to many phenomena in the bio-social sciences [RJ11a].
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relationship between profit and investment, the profitability gap determines the
rate of investment, then
∂Ij
∂pj
= Ij (4.7)
where Ij is the investment at which the profitability gap is added onto investment
per se positively, and pj the rate of profit defined as pj = Pj/Kj. The profitability-
investment equation shows that only replacement investment will occur when
profit-earners expect a profit rate that merely covers the opportunity cost of
holding their capital stock constant. If the profitability gap is positive (negative),
they will invest more (less) than is needed to keep their capital stock constant.
4.2.3 Water Supply and Efficiency
For a given amount of water supply, the water efficiency reflects technical change,
i.e. the accumulation of the capital of the second kind, which makes up the
total capital along with the capital of the first kind. For a given technical level,
water efficiency also depends on short-run water supply, i.e. if the water supply
is sufficient (insufficient) in short run, they will enhance the water use more
efficiently (inefficiently), hence
∂hj
∂Hj
= −α3 (4.8)
where α3 is the rate at which the increase of water supply weakens the water
efficiency. Investment can improve water efficiency with an increasing marginal
entropy production [Key36, Dal96] according to
∂hj
∂Ij
= α4 (4.9)
and
∂hj
∂S
=
α5
hj
(4.10)
respectively, where α4 is the rate at which the increase of investment strengthens
the water efficiency, α5 is the rate at which the increase of water efficiency is
weakened along with the entropy growth. This means that investment enhances
the efficiency of water use, however, due to the second law of thermodynamics
that matter and energy tend toward a state in which no useful work can be done,
because the energy in the system is too diffuse, increasing water efficiency causes
the increasing growth rate of entropy production in the system.
Exogenous annual water availability is affected by climate change, and has an
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impact on annual water supply. The amount of available water supply Hj follows
a linear negative function of climate change index G, i.e.
∂Hj
∂G
= −α6 (4.11)
where α6 is the rate at which the climate change is added onto the change of the
water supply negatively.
4.3 Food Consumption
This section covers the simulation for food consumers (agents) at the micro-scale.
At time t, for a given agent, their rank determines their wage income and food
choice. It follows that lower ranking means higher wage income, and that people
with lower ranking choose more expensive food. For heterogeneous consumers,
the share of food consumption compared with total consumption depends on
wage income according to the Engel ratio that is constant in time in developed
countries. Considering that the wage income is far more than the money cost of
human energy requirements in developed countries, food share can be more stable
than in developing and emerging countries, where the share of food consumption
may experience a more severe change along with the rapid economic growth
[TD07, Tim12, RTM12] and more volatile food price shock [Ale08, AB11, Caf13,
Gou13]. Except for the rate of unemployment, food price and system-based
agent ranking, all other variables in the system are closed. Wage income and
food consumption occupy the important position: for each agent, wage income
determines her share of the total food consumption.
4.3.1 Wage and Food Share
According to Steve Keen [Kee01],
A microeconomic model which is inconsistent with such things
as business cycles, sustained unemployment, commonplace excess ca-
pacity, and the importance of credit, is to Post Keynesians an invalid
model.
The economic agent’s wage here is macro-economy-based, i.e. the aggregate
wage is yielded in the macroeconomic system, while the private wage follows a
given distribution function, which is independent of the macro wage share, but
depends on the given coefficients. Given N consumers (agents) in an economy,
the wage income for kth agent (k = 1, 2, . . . , N) follows Zipf’s law [Axt01, New05,
YRJ09]
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Wk = W1
(
1− log k
logN
)
(4.12)
where W1 is the wage for the richest food consumer at time t. At the same time,
the share of food consumption ek(0 < ek ≤ 1) reflects the agents’ behavior as it
depends on the wage, i.e. the Engel ratio, which is the percentage share of food
expenses to the total wage income. This is considered a very important proxy
indicator of poverty as it relates to the capacity of humans to access food with
their acquired income. Humans having a high Engel ratio have low incomes and a
high percentage of those low incomes are used to acquire food for survival. Hence
ek = 1− Wk
W1
=
log k
logN
(4.13)
Hence, given the total population, the Engel ratio depends on the rank of each
food consumer.
4.3.2 Food Choice and Consumption
Food choice [Kea10, DGN13, DBSB13] is affected by the rank of food consumer
and food price following the assumption that lower ranking consumers choose
more expensive food which is produced by smaller land/water users who may use
more expensive approaches, such as with organic food that uses less industrial
inputs but more labor etc. Therefore, there exists a functional relationship be-
tween food choice and wage income, i.e. the kth consumer selects food made by
the jth producer, hence
∂(ekWk)
∂Rj
= βj,k (4.14)
where all βs are positive parameters, and βj,k is the rate at which the change of
wage income for the kth consumer is added onto the change of the consumption
of food produced by jth producer positively. Furthermore, it is argued that the
matrix β = (βj,k)M,N is sparse, i.e.
β =

β1,1 β1,2 · · · β1,N
β2,1 β2,2 · · · β2,N
...
...
. . .
...
βM,1 βM,2 · · · βM,N
 =

0 0 0 . .
.
. .
.
. .
.
0 0 . .
.
. .
.
. .
.
0
0 . .
.
. .
.
. .
.
0 0
. .
.
. .
.
. .
.
0 0 0

(4.15)
Hence, for kth agent, food consumption is
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ekWk =
M∑
j=1
βj,kRj (4.16)
The micro food consumption, therefore, can decompose to a set of food items
produced at the micro-level.
4.3.3 Saving, Debt Flow and Consumption
By analogy with the effect of the profitability gap on investment decisions [RR08],
and due to the paradox of thrift that increasing unemployment leads to an in-
crease in the propensity to save causing a decrease in effective demand causing
unemployment to rise, it is proposed that the unemployment gap has an impact
on the population’s saving behavior. Therefore, the exogenous unemployment
rate u affects personal saving/debt behavior through
∂Xk
∂u
= −Xk (4.17)
where
Xk =
{
Vk if saving exists
Bk if debt flow exists
(4.18)
is the saving/debt flow at which the unemployment gap is added onto saving/debt
flow per se negatively.
Therefore the kth agent’s consumption can be represented by the difference
of debt/saving flow and wage income, i.e.
Ck = Wk − d
dt
Xk (4.19)
4.4 Macroeconomic System Dynamics
According to Marc Lavoie [Lav11], the usual Kaleckian model consists of three
equations: a pricing equation [Dut84, Lav95, HO03, Set09, Ohn13, Kee13], a
saving equation [Ste79, Mar84, HLVT11, Pal13a], and an investment equation
[Sen63, Ste79, FHP88, Lav95, LRS04, FDP13]. This is established based on three
assumptions, i.e. (1) the pricing function in terms of the profit rate depends on
the profit share, the rate of capacity utilization, and the capital to capacity ratio;
(2) the saving function in growth terms depends only on the profit rate and the
propensity to save out of profits; and (3) the investment function in growth terms
depends on some constant, the rate of capacity utilization, and the normal profit
rate (or the share of profit).
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Building on the Kaleckian model, by introducing entropy to modify the ac-
cumulation of capital (i.e. accumulation of capital stock depends on investment
and entropy production), we develop a model for macroeconomic system dynam-
ics. In the model, it is assumed that entropy exists, and evolves independently
of the development of the economy, however, the path of energy consumption
has an impact on entropy production. Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen’s conception
of “useful work” also has been introduced to replace the application of energy
[GR79] because the engine of economic growth has been the growing use (thanks
to declining costs) of energy service (useful work), not energy per se, according to
Robert Ayres and his colleagues [AAW03, AW05, WA12]. Useful work is defined
as the sum total of all types of physical work by animals, prime movers and heat
transfer systems, and consists of three categories: the first category is muscle
work, for which the fuel is food or feed; the second category is fuel used by prime
movers to do mechanical work; and the third category is fuel used to generate
heat.
4.4.1 Entropy Production and Water Supply
Entropy is a measure of the number of distinct ways in which a system may be
arranged, often taken to be a measure of disorder, or a measure of progressing
towards thermodynamic equilibrium [PNB72, DC01]. The entropy of an isolated
system never decreases, because isolated systems spontaneously evolve towards
a maximum at thermodynamic equilibrium, whereas the entropy of an open sys-
tem can either be maintained at the same level or decreased (negative entropy)
[DC01, Dew05, MS06, KMC10, MB10]. According to the second law of thermo-
dynamics, that matter and energy tend toward a state in which no useful work
can be done, because the energy in the system is too diffuse, in an open system,
change in entropy in a given time interval comprises entropy production due to
an irreversible process in the system (an internal component) and entropy flow
due to exchange with the environment (an external component). An open sys-
tem needs to maintain an exchange of energy and resources with the environment
in order to be able to continuously renew itself. Under the second law, the en-
ergy or matter from the production process will be converted to a less ordered
form, i.e. the final products tend to have higher entropy than the raw materials
[HBM03, AA10].
Integrating the existence of entropy production, according to the first law of
thermodynamics and the conception of useful work, we have
γDD + T = S + γCC (4.20)
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where all γs are positive parameters, terms on the left-hand side consist of the
solar energy inputs as a constant multiple γD of food production D =
∑M
j=1Dj
by photosynthesis and the useful work T at time t, and the terms on the right-
hand side comprise the entropy S generating from energy usage processes and
the influence of final actual consumption C =
∑N
k=1Ck on energy through a
constant multiple γC . In a closed ecosystem, entropy production is isolated from
the economic process, however, and from the perspective of an open ecological-
economic system, it depends on the choice of useful work path [GR79], whereas
useful work follows a logistic growth curve [Smi10a, Smi10b], i.e.
∂T
∂YA
=
T
YA
(
1− T
T
)
(4.21)
where the useful work growth in ideal conditions with an exponential growth
rate at which the growth rate of actual output adjusts it, and T is the existing
useful work stored in fossil fuels. Therefore despite entropy being isolated from
the economic system and economic development, the entropy production is path
dependent on the useful work consumption. As mentioned in chapter 3 in this
thesis, the flow of entropy production can be determined by two factors: the
waste arising from capital stock and the waste from labor stock. Hence, the rate
of capacity utilization and the rate of unemployment become two core concepts
in our analysis.
As above, development on water supply and efficiency in micro-scale, we use
a similar way to develop a dynamics for water supply in macro-scale. Indeed,
agricultural water supply is determined by climate change index G and its ra-
tio of water-climate g, where G is exogenous variable and the ratio depends on
investment I, i.e. H = gG, where
d
dt
g = γgI (4.22)
and
d
dt
G = −γGG (4.23)
where G, as mentioned above, is an index for climate, i.e. a bigger index number
implies less rainfall and also higher temperature, γg is the rate at which the
investment increases the water efficiency under climate change, and γG is a decay
rate with γG > 0.
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4.4.2 Capacity Utilization and Unemployment
Effective demand is seen to be a central, if not the central, issue of Keynes’s
The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money [Key36]. The Kaleck-
ian model has progressively become quite popular among heterodox economists
concerned with macroeconomics and effective demand issues [HLVT11]. Micha l
Kalecki’s ideas on income distribution are necessary additions to Keynes’s ar-
guments regarding the determination of the level of effective demand [LM99].
As mentioned in chapter 3 the fluctuation in effective demand is responsible for
business cycles.
Denote YE is expected aggregate output, after decomposing, Pj is individual
profit for jth agricultural agents in agricultural sector, PM+1 is aggregate profit
in non-agricultural sector, and Wk is individual wage for kth agents, i.e.
YE =
M∑
j=1
Pj +
N∑
k=1
Wk + PM+1 = P +W (4.24)
where P =
∑M+1
j=1 Pj is aggregate profit income, W =
∑N
k=1Wk aggregate wage
income. By similar technique, the actual aggregate output YA can be decomposed
as
YA =
M∑
j=1
Ij +
N∑
k=1
Ck + IM+1 = I + C (4.25)
where Ck is the individual consumption of the kth agent, and Ij the individual
investment for the jth agricultural agent in the agricultural sector, IM+1 the ag-
gregate investment in the non-agricultural sector, I =
∑M+1
j=1 Ij the aggregate
investment, and C =
∑N
k=1Ck the aggregate consumption. The difference be-
tween actual and expected output can be represented by the aggregate difference
between profit and investment for producer and the difference between wage and
consumption for consumer, i.e.
YE − YA = (P +W )− (I + C) = (P − I) + (W − C) (4.26)
Hence, the rate of capacity utilization is defined as the ratio between actual
output and expected output, therefore y = YA/YE, where YE is expected output
11
that may be bigger than actual output. Denoting L is the amount of labor supply
including agricultural labor and non-agricultural labor, and LE as employed labor,
unemployment rate u is defined as the ratio between unemployed labor and total
labor supply, i.e. u = (L−LE)/L and the labor productivity l is defined as actual
11Capacity utilization is the ratio between actual output and full capacity output [Kal57].
We here assume that the sum of profit and wage proxies full capacity output.
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output produced by per worker, i.e. l = YA/L.
The amount of employed labor grows with capital stock at a constant rate γE,
i.e.
d
dt
LE = γEKLE (4.27)
The growth of labor productivity responds positively to the rate of capacity
utilization, and negatively to the rate of unemployment, therefore involuntary
unemployment is likely, namely so-called technological unemployment [Key30],
hence
d
dt
l = (γl − γy(1− y)− γuu)l (4.28)
where γl is the exponential rate at which the growth of labor productivity grows
under the condition of full employment and full capacity utilization, γy is the rate
at which labor productivity is weakened by idle capacity, and γu is the rate at
which labor productivity is weakened by unemployment.
4.4.3 Investment and Consumption
Investment is a core activity that is critical for achieving sustainable develop-
ment. Jerry Courvisanos [Cou05, CJ06] develops a sustainable framework which
begins with an identifiable goal and then designs a strategy of public interven-
tion in order to implement the goal. Innovation is stimulated with supportive
public policies for the attainment of sustainable economic and ecological devel-
opment. Furthermore, he [Cou09] argues that, “neither will deliver sustainable
development unless market uncertainty can be ameliorated through public invest-
ment strategies that create a predictable but strategic focus to induce innovation
that is cumulatively changing towards an ecologically sustainable investment pro-
gram.” In this context, Colin Richardson and his colleagues [RCC11] argues that
investment “needs to shift away from the existing techno-economic paradigm
(e.g., fossil fuel energy) to a new techno-economic paradigm that is ecologically
sustainable (e.g., renewable energy).”
Capital stock, profit and investment decisions are viewed as integrated in
the Kaleckian investment equation, and the profitability gap [RR08] links these
variables together. When the upper boundary of capital flow is reviewed and
defined by introducing the conception of entropy, the definition of profitability
can be modified, and then investment decisions can be changed according to the
profitability-investment equation.
As mentioned above, for the jth (j = 1, 2, . . . ,M) agricultural producer cap-
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ital stock is denoted by Kj, and non-agricultural capital stock is KM+1, hence,
the aggregate capital stock K =
∑M+1
j=1 Kj follows that aggregate investment
I =
∑M+1
j=1 Ij contributes its accumulation while the entropy depletes it, namely
d
dt
K = I − γSS (4.29)
where γS is the rate at which the entropy reduces the capital flow. The invest-
ment dynamics follows, with the growth of investment being determined by the
profitability gap [RR08, RCC11], i.e.
∂I
∂p
= I (4.30)
where the rate of profit is defined as a ratio between aggregate profit P =∑M+1
j=1 Pj and aggregate capital stock K, i.e. p = P/K.
Denote the share of agricultural capital stock κ as the ratio between agricul-
tural capital stock to the aggregate capital stock, i.e.
κ =
∑M
j=1Kj∑M+1
j=1 Kj
(4.31)
Increasing actual output decays the share of agricultural sector, furthermore,
it is assumed as
∂κ
∂YA
= −γκκ (4.32)
where γκ is the rate at which the marginal increasing output decays the share of
agricultural capital stock. According to Equation (4.5), therefore, for jth food
producer, capital stock can be represented as
Kj =
κK(logM − log j)
M logM +
∑M
j=1 log j
(4.33)
4.4.4 Income Distribution
The most famous Post Keynesian model is on growth and distribution 12 and was
developed in 1956 by such Cambridge economists as Joan Robinson and Nicholas
Kaldor to explain the distribution of income [Lav09a]. The Cambridge model is a
hybrid of Keynesian and pre-Keynesian features whereas the neo-Kaleckian model
is Keynesian [Pal13a]. Recent literature on the mechanism of income distribution
12A good survey on the Post Keynesian models of economic growth and income distribution
is given by [KS11] highlighting that “the adjustment of savings to investment, rather than
the other way round, is seen to be a central, if not the central, message of Keynes’s General
Theory”.
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and economic growth from Post Keynesian and Kaleckian perspectives has also
been impressive, with class conflict and the Cambridge theory of income distribu-
tion being surveyed from an international perspective [Pal06]. Furthermore, the
paradox of an unprecedented deteriorative change in income distribution and a
stable growth in capital stock and output is reviewed [Lav09b], the link between
rising shareholder power, increasing pressure on labor, and redistribution at the
expense of wages, with the macroeconomic effects on capacity utilization, profits
and capital accumulation is established [HVT10]. Managerial pay is introduced
into the Kaleckian model [Pal13c], while the stability of the Kaleckian model of
economic growth and income distribution is surveyed [HLVT11, Lav11, HLVT12],
together with the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial
actors and financial institutions in the Post Keynesian model of growth and dis-
tribution is developed [HVT11], and the relationship between income distribution
and capacity utilization in the Kaleckian model is examined [NF12]. Post Keyne-
sian economists also have explained many economic phenomena, such as inflation
being a consequence of conflicts between social classes over the proper distribution
of income [Cas03].
Denoting W =
∑N
k=1Wk as aggregate wage income, the share of wage income
is defined as the ratio between wage and expected output13, i.e. ω = W/YE,
while the share of profit is defined as the ratio between profit and actual output
φ = P/YE.
The share of profit can determine the rate of mark-up [Ble89, BM90] in the
short run by
m =
φ
1− φ (4.34)
where the share of profit is closer to 1, the rate of mark-up is closer to positive
infinite, whereas if the share of profit is closer to 0, the rate of mark-up is closer
to 0. Therefore
∂m
∂φ
=
1
(1− φ)2 (4.35)
The determinants of income distribution are complicated. First of all, the ratio
between the number of producers M and the number of consumers N determines
the degree of monopoly for the long run, which affects the shares between profit
and wage, i.e. ∃ > 0, s.t.
13Indeed, it is reasonable and more convenient here to use expected output instead of actual
output that consists of investment and consumption, because for every two continuous time
periods the former actual output is the latter expected output, which is not always equal to the
latter actual output; however, the gap between expected and actual outputs will tend to zero
under a different system environment.
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∣∣∣∣MN − 1γω φω
∣∣∣∣ <  (4.36)
where γω is a constant to link two ratios, hence∣∣∣∣φ− γωMγωM +N
∣∣∣∣ <  (4.37)
An increasing unemployment rate can weaken the bargaining power of work-
ers, then decrease the share of wages and increase the share of profits [Cas03],
i.e.
∂φ
∂u
=
γφφ
u
log
(
γωM
(γωM +N)φ
)
(4.38)
where γφ is the rate at which the change of the unemployment rate is added
onto the change of the profit share positively, and the logarithmic item is used to
represent a long run tendency of profit share as defined by Equation (4.37).
4.4.5 Sizes of Firm and Population
In ecology, the size of the ecosystem has become an important variable related to
biodiversity. In 1972, Robert May [May72] gave a sophisticated and important
analysis of the trade-off between stability and biodiversity, showing that larger
communities were less likely to be stable, and he dispelled absolutely the idea
that greater diversity necessarily begets stability.
Due to recognizing the sophistication of the size of firm and population, the
model introduces the pattern of firm and population sizes to represent a possible
path simulating the degree of monopoly that affects macroeconomic behavior.
Additionally Malthusian spirits can be reflected by the influences on the growth
rate of useful work in the ecosystem, and capital stock and wage income in the
macroeconomic system.
The classical model of the dynamics of population size is the Verhulst logistic
equation14 [CL03, PSS08, Sak13, SRMD13]
∂N
dW
=
N
W
(
1− N
γNYA
)
(4.39)
where γN is treated as a variable to account for the ratio at which the fluctuations
in available resources depend on actual output that is used as a variable to account
for limitations of population growth. Indeed, the equation is not able to be
14The Verhulst system is an ecological model for managing resources, where in this model
the exploitation rate of the resource is proportional to the biomass and the economic activity
[CQSP07].
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used to do cross-country analysis because of how complicated is the relationship
between economic growth and population. However, for the regional model in
a given country, a constant ratio between output and population is acceptable.
Furthermore, the Verhulst equation reflects a Malthusian perspective. Generally
economic growth is limited by increasing entropy production and by an unstable
intake of useful work.
Applying the Verhulst logistic equation to model firm size, the number of
firms depends on the size of the economy as measured by the capital stock, hence
∂M
∂K
=
M
K
(
1− M
γMYA
)
(4.40)
where γM is the rate at which the change of the agricultural capital stock is added
onto the change of the amount of firms.
Finally assuming that population growth and growth of labor supply share a
similar dependency in the long run, we can have
L =
N
1 + γL
(4.41)
where γL can be understood as demographic dependency ratio, i.e. an age-
population ratio of those typically not in the labor force (the dependent part)
and those typically in the labor force (the productive part). Indeed, a static
dependency ratio is assumed here.
4.5 A Simulation Model for the Murray-Darling
Basin Economy
The Murray-Darling Basin Economy Simulation Model, aims to develop new the-
oretical approaches that relax some of the conflicting assumptions of economic
theory, to move towards a more self-consistent approach to understanding and
predicting future trends in an economy that values both production and pro-
tection of scarce environmental resources, and to test a new theoretical model
against one of Australia’s most drought-stressed agricultural regions.
The model is built on a foundation of sustainability economics and complex
systems theory. It assumes that the presence of moderate or extreme water
scarcity affects economic growth, and that scaling and universality may hold in
complex social, economic and ecological systems. We will assume that complex
dynamical ecological and economic systems can be integrated in a framework that
develops the concept of the profitability gap [RR08] as the endogenous driver of
the economic growth trajectory.
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System Dynamics modeling [Hom06, RGMS07, PSS08, VGR+11, LS12, RS12a]
studies systems from the top down by establishing a set of ordinary differential
equations on the precondition that complex behaviors of the system (e.g., invol-
untary unemployment) result from the interplay of feedback loops, stocks, and
flows, all occurring within the bounded endogenous system. The method arose
originally in management science [FMR76] from the recognition of the need to
explicitly model non-linear processes that are characteristic of complex phenom-
ena such as policy resistance, the law of unintended consequences, and the often
counter-intuitive behavior of social systems. Computer simulations are used to
track accumulations of stocks (e.g., capital, entropy, population), which are deter-
mined by flows (e.g., profitability), and feedback loops (causal loops with either
balancing or reinforcing effects).
Agent-based modeling [EA96, Eps99, Eps02, Hom06, RGMS07, EPH11, GMA+11,
VGR+11, LS12] is used to study complex systems from the bottom up by exam-
ining how their individual elements (agents) behave as a series of functions of
individual properties, their environment, and their interactions with each other.
Through these behaviors, emergent properties of the overall system are revealed.
The method arose originally in computational mathematics in the context of sim-
ulating individual behaviors that are characteristic of heterogeneous evolution and
are often interactive or interdependent with each other.
The model includes three separate parts, i.e. a Post Keynesian Ecological
Macroeconomic part modeled using a system dynamics approach and Kaleckian
micro-investment behavior and micro-consumption behavior modeled using an
agent-based approach. These parts are linked together by aggregating micro
individual behavior into the behavior of the macro system, and feedback of macro
behavior on micro behavior by introducing an entropy production function based
on exogenous climate change.
In this section, we fuse the ideas developed above and apply our model to the
specific case of the Murray-Darling basin, Australia. We propose an 11 differential
equations system as below
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ddt
L = αLL(t) (4.42a)
d
dt
LE = αELE(t)
(
1−
(
LE
L
− (1− u)
))
(4.42b)
d
dt
K = αII(t)− αG
G(t)
(4.42c)
d
dt
KE = αKKE(t)
(
1−
(
KE
K
− y
))
(4.42d)
d
dt
I = (αP − αK)P (t)
K(t)
I(t) (4.42e)
d
dt
G = αGG(t) (4.42f)
d
dt
P = αPP (t)
(
1−
(
P
Y
− φ
))
(4.42g)
d
dt
Y = αY Y (t) (4.42h)
d
dt
u = αuu− αuφuφ− αuyuy (4.42i)
d
dt
φ = −αφφ+ αφuφu− αφyφy (4.42j)
d
dt
y = −αyy + αyuyu− αyφyφ (4.42k)
where Equations (4.42a)-(4.42b) represent the dynamics of labor force supply and
employed labor. We do not model population growth explicitly and assume that
labor supply can be represented by a simple exponential growth curve [BBB+12,
NAB+13, Sak13]. Employed labor growth is regulated by the entire labor supply
growth and the rate of unemployment in the macroeconomic system because we
do not assume that full employment is automatically achieved (Equation (4.42i)).
Equations (4.42c)-(4.42d) show the dynamics of capital stock and utilized capital
in the macroeconomic system (where the rate of change of capital is determined
by current capital stock, investment and climate change, and the rate of change
of utilized capital flow) is regulated by the rate of capacity utilization, again
because we do not assume that full capacity utilization is automatically achieved
(Equation (4.42k)). Equation (4.42e) is the Richardson profitability-investment
gap equation [RR08] which describes the relation between investment and the
difference between the rate of profit between contiguous periods, and where the
rate of change of profit is given by Equation (4.42g) which is limited by the share of
profit. Equation (4.42f) describes the change of climate through potential annual
rainfall, i.e. the rainfall in the Murray-Darling basin has been predicted by three
scenarios - a high global warming scenario, a medium global warming scenario,
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and a low global warming scenario. These represent dry extreme, median and wet
extreme weather according to a report to the Australian Government from the
CSIRO Murray-Darling Basin Sustainable Yields Project, Water availability in
the Murray-Darling Basin, where we neglect hydrodynamics per se, but highlight
the influence on the economy of changing annual rainfall. In Equation (4.42h)
the output which follows an exponential growth is reliable because we use current
price to measure all variables related to the macroeconomic system. Equations
(4.42i), (4.42j) and (4.42k) are integrated to describe the nexus of the rate of
unemployment, the share of profit, and the rate of capacity utilization using a
three-dimensional Lotka-Volterra differential equation system. Water security in
the Murray-Darling Basin depends on the Australian macro-economy, and on the
climate features in the Basin. In an open ecological-economic system, the failure
of coordinating the parameters in equation system (4.42) will result in a lose-lose
situation.
4.6 Parameter Estimation
In this section, we use ABS data for the period 1978-2005, where all macroeco-
nomic variables are based on current price, to estimate the parameters in equation
system (4.42).
Other than the last three equations (4.42i), (4.42j) and (4.42k) which simu-
late the rate of unemployment, profit share and the rate of capacity utilization
respectively, we can induce closed-form or analytical solutions for each equation
if all other variables are seen as parameters. Based on these analytical solutions,
we estimate the baseline parameter values as shown in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Parameter values for the model (I)
Parameter Description Value
αL The growth rate of labor supply 0.0186
αE The growth rate of employed labor 0.0186
αI The rate at which investment increases capital stock 0.3069
αG The rate at which climate change diminishes capital
stock
−1.2533×
107
αK The growth rate of utilized capital 0.0722
αP The growth rate of profit 0.0811
αY The growth rate of output 0.0697
Figure 4.5 shows the difference between observed and predicted data in the
ordinary least squares sense where blue scatter plots are the observed data, the
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green line plots the simulated, and blue bar plots the differences. labor supply (as
shown in Figure 4.5a) and actual output (as shown in Figure 4.5f) are assumed
to follow an exponential growth curve; employed labor (as shown in Figure 4.5b),
utilized capital (as shown in Figure 4.5d) and profit (as shown in Figure 4.5e)
are assumed to follow an exponential logistic growth curve, i.e. saturation exists
and depends on the rate of unemployment, the rate of capacity utilization, and
profit share respectively; and capital stock (as shown in Figure 4.5c) is assumed
to follow a linear growth trend, where the rate of growth depends on investment
and climate change.
4.7 Hypothesis Validation
In this section, we use ABS data for the period 2006-2012, where all macroeco-
nomic variables are based on the current price, to validate the model described
by equation system (4.42).
Figure 4.6 shows the comparison between real-world and simulated data where
green line plots are diagonals, and the coefficients of determination (R2) are avail-
able. The results of the hypothesis validation show that equation system (4.42)
provides a consistent prediction for the dynamics of labor supply, employed la-
bor, capital stock, utilized capital, profit, and output when we use the coefficients
estimated by historical data, and control the other parameters (the rainfall, the
rate of unemployment, the share of profit, and the rate of capacity utilization)
using actual (i.e. not historical) data.
Particularly Figure 4.6c and Figure 4.6d show the real and simulated value
for capital stock and the utilized capital stock respectively based on Equation
(4.42c) and Equation (4.42d), and indicate that both are underestimated. The
lower than average rainfall (other than the year of 2010) over the period 2006-
2012, and hence an atypically severe climate constraint is responsible for the
underestimation.
4.8 Results
In this section, we apply the parameters shown in Table 4.2 which are validated
by the real-world data over the period of 2006-2012. Additionally, we provide
some unvalidated parameters that appeared in Equations (4.42f) (4.42i), (4.42j),
and (4.42k), i.e. the rainfall, the rate of unemployment, the share of profit,
and the rate of capacity utilization. As mentioned above, without government
intervention, intrinsic business cycles are represented by the interaction between
the rate of unemployment, the share of profit, and the rate of capacity utilization
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Figure 4.5: Parameter estimation
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(f) Actual Output
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Figure 4.6: Hypothesis validation
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(a) Labor Supply R2 = 0.9933
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(b) Employed Labor R2 = 0.9603
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(c) Capital Stock R2 = 0.9972
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(f) Actual Output R2 = 0.9858
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under the Lotka-Volterra system. In effect, we argue here that annual rainfall
forecasts are impossible when the best accessible resources are CSIRO’s climate
change scenarios data, and that the last three equations reflect the Post Keynesian
economic idea while regressed parameters are unstable due to the characteristics
of three-dimension Lotka-Volterra equations. Table 4.3 gives the parameters, and
Figure 4.7 shows the curves in the corresponding three-dimension phase space.
Table 4.3: Parameter values for the model (II)
Parameter Description Value
αu The growth rate of unemployment 1.5714
αuφ The rate at which the profit share reduces the
unemployment
3.6667
αuy The rate at which the capacity utilization reduces
the unemployment
1.8333
αφ The growth rate of profit share 0.2895
αφu The rate at which the unemployment increases the
profit share
131.2667
αφy The rate at which the capacity utilization reduces
the profit share
11
αy The growth rate of utilized capital 0.1375
αyu The rate at which the unemployment increases the
capacity utilization
1.8333
αyφ The rate at which the profit share increases the
capacity utilization
0.3548
We use initial values taken from the ABS data for the labor force of 6.3554
million15, employed labor 5.8281 million16, capital stock 394111 million dollars17,
utilized capital 308692 million dollars18, investment 33165 million dollars19, an-
nual rainfall 457mm20, profit 33190 million dollars21, and output 128341 million
dollars22. Three scenarios of climate change have been used following the report to
the Australian Government from the CSIRO Murray-Darling Basin Sustainable
Yields Project23, Water availability in the Murray-Darling Basin which predicts
156202.0 - labor Force [Aus13e]
166202.0 - labor Force [Aus13e]
175204.0 - Australian System of National Accounts [Aus13d]
185204.0 - Australian System of National Accounts [Aus13d]
195206.0 - Australian National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure and Product
[Aus13c]
20Australian Climate Variability & Change [Bur13b]
215206.0 - Australian National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure and Product
[Aus13c]
225206.0 - Australian National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure and Product
[Aus13c]
23The Southern Oscillation [Aus12] refers to a massive see-sawing of atmospheric pressure
69
Figure 4.7: The nexus of unemployment, profit share and capacity utilization
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a 13% decrease under a dry extreme 2030 climate, a 3% decrease under a me-
dian 2030 climate, and an 8% increase under a wet extreme 2030 climate relative
to a baseline of 457mm which is the average annual rainfall from 1895 to 2006
(averaged across the entire Murray-Darling basin). Two scenarios of government
intervention are compared. The first consists of minimizing business cycles and
macroeconomic fluctuations through the stabilization of unemployment, profit
share and capacity utilization to full employment and full capacity utilization
The second consists of no intervention i.e. following intrinsic business cycles
where the rate of unemployment, the share of profit, and the rate of capacity
utilization interact according to a Lotka-Volterra scheme (Figure 4.7).
Figure 4.8 shows that from a long run perspective, government intervention
can increase the working opportunities for a labor force facing climate change.
Figure 4.9 shows that government intervention can increase the utilization of
between the northern Australian-Indonesian region and the central Pacific Ocean, links to
sea surface temperatures in the Pacific Ocean, and affects the climate of the Murray-Darling
Basin. The Southern Oscillation Index, measuring the strength of the Southern Oscillation,
is defined by fluctuations in the surface pressure difference between Tahiti and Darwin, and
relates closely to the main weather features of the Basin. Severe and widespread drought over
the Basin generally accompanies an extreme in the Oscillation when the pressure is abnormally
high at Darwin and abnormally low at Tahiti and vice versa. Dry extreme years are called El
Nin˜o years while wet extreme years are called La Nin˜a years.
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Figure 4.8: Predicted employed labor. Government intervention can increase the
working opportunities for a labor force facing climate change.
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Figure 4.9: Predicted utilized capital. Government intervention can increase the
utilization of capital stock.
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capital stock comparing with the scenario without government intervention.
Figure 4.10 shows that investment remains stronger with government inter-
vention.
Figure 4.11 shows that the profit is stronger with government intervention
than without it in a long run perspective.
4.9 Conclusion and Discussion
This chapter constructs an ecological macroeconomic model based on a Post
Keynesian model of economic growth and income distribution to simulate the
combined macroeconomic system and water ecosystem under the influence of
climate change. The predictions account for the response of the Murray-Darling
basin economy to water availability and climate change as well as to potential
government interventions. The focus of our analysis is on how the macroeconomic
system responds to these shocks. Significantly, our model does not assume that
capital accumulation is isolated from nature. Instead, we derive the impact of
natural capital from our specification of how ecological economic insights can
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Figure 4.10: Predicted investment. Investment remains stronger with government
intervention.
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Figure 4.11: Predicted profit. Profit is stronger with government intervention.
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be fused into Post Keynesian traditions. This can be interpreted as entropy
production diminishing capital accumulation, or diminishing the present stock of
capital at the time that investment contributes to capital.
From this ecological economic aspect on the theory of production and supply,
complementarity between capital inputs replaces substitution, and most signifi-
cantly, the second law of thermodynamics is applied, and entropy is introduced.
From the Post Keynesian viewpoint on the theory of expenditure and demand,
effective demand lies at the core of the economic system, and involuntary un-
employment exists, therefore the paradox of thrift and insufficient demand can
accompany business cycles.
Our model fuses the work of Herman Daly [Dal96] on complementarity of
inputs, Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen on entropy generation [GR79], Robert May
on biodiversity and stability [May72], Micha l Kalecki on investment [Kal71], Marc
Lavoie on distribution [Lav92], Jerry Courvisanos on business cycles [Cou96],
and Colin Richardson on the role of the profitability gap [RR08]. Under this
framework the case of the Murray-Darling basin is studied based on data over
the period of 1978-2010. We apply the model to the prediction over the next
century of the impact of climate change and government intervention on capital
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accumulation and investment dynamics, as well as on profit.
Due to the lack of data on useful work supply and entropy production within
a given region, we replaced this with future water supply using the report to
the Australian Government from the CSIRO Murray-Darling Basin Sustainable
Yields Project, Water availability in the Murray-Darling Basin. Future work can
build on this simulation of the water ecosystem based on more available data,
and incorporate a deeper fusion with the macroeconomic system.
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Chapter 5
Food Riots
In chapter 4 we proposed an ecological-economic framework based on Post Key-
nesian ecological economic methodology to integrate the food and water economy,
and applied it in a case study of the Murray-Darling basin in Australia. Clearly
water is not just a constraint in Australia, but is a growing constraint on global
food production, especially in areas of the highest population densities. Australia
is fortunate in producing more food than it consumes and neighboring countries
rely on these exports for food security. The performance of Australian agriculture
is also a determinant of global food commodity prices, which in turn are known
to impact on social unrest. The Asian region, particularly the south and east, is
having an increasing influence on Australian politics. The developing economies
of Asia are experiencing serious environmental and social problems that threaten
to undermine future development, food security, and regional stability. Rapid
economic transformation, increasing income and rising populations in developing
countries have been key drivers behind the rapidly growing global demand for
food. As water and other natural resources (like the availability of chemical ele-
ments for making fertilizers1) increasingly limit the potential of agriculture, the
economic and social impacts of loss of food security will increase. It is therefore
essential not just to understand the links between ecology and economics, but
also to understand the consequences for social stability.
Food security is a growing concern worldwide. More than one billion people
are estimated to lack sufficient dietary energy availability [Bar10]. Food-related
riots may take place after absolute food shortages arising from physical food
production and accumulation shortages or economic shortages due to inefficient
food distribution. We call physical shortage “absolute shortage”, and economic
1An NPK fertilizer is one that contains three key constituent chemical elements that are
Nitrogen (N), Phosphorus (P) and Potassium (K). The three elements promote plant growth in
three different ways. In simple terms, these are: Nitrogen that promotes the growth of leaves
and vegetation, Phosphorous that promotes root growth and Potassium that promotes flower
and fruit growth.
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shortage “relative shortage”. Absolute food shortage may take place because
of hysteresis effects from relative shortage and natural shocks in the short run.
However from the long run viewpoint, absolute shortage does not exist because
Malthus’s theory that food production can limit the growth of population has
been proven false due to technical progress raising crop yields. Therefore relative
food shortage is of greater concern, as a large part of the population cannot access
food even if the total amount is more than is needed for population subsistence.
Food trading and food exchange contribute to the population’s low capacity to ac-
cess food. According to the seminal work of Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines:
An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation [Sen81], unequal food distribution can
cause famine even when aggregate food production levels are more than sufficient
for subsistence, that is
starvation is the characteristic of some people not having enough
food to eat. It is not the characteristic of there being not enough food
to eat. While the latter can be a cause of the former, it is but one of
many possible causes.
For example, local weather shocks can reduce local food production and in-
come as well, since incomes in developing countries often depend on agriculture, so
that those in affected areas cannot purchase food from unaffected regions [Sen81].
Institutional limits, like an economy-wide centralized plan, may undermine col-
lection and respond to new information in the presence of an aggregate shock
to food production, so that even regions with higher per capita food production
can suffer higher famine mortality rates [MQY10]. Therefore, a famine can occur
even if aggregate food production is high [Sen81, Til83, Bar10, MQY10, Wan11].
However, food shortages, including physical and economic, do not necessarily
lead to food riots. Besides physical factors and economic factors, there are polit-
ical explanations, social situations, and demographic structures activating food
riots depending on a specific path. For example, some food riots can be most
meaningfully explained, not in a simple economic formula of food shortage, but
within a political context of changing governmental policy and in terms of secular
economic changes in marketing arrangements for grain [Til71, Til76]. In rela-
tion to the physical environment, recent quantitative studies have causally linked
climatic environmental events to human conflict [BTN+11, HMC11, OWL+12,
SBK+12, HBM13]. The direct causes of food riots and conflicts are still contro-
versial across a range of spatial and temporal scales, for example environmental
changes may increase the risk of violent conflict, but not necessarily in a system-
atic way and unconditionally, and the effects of environmental changes on violent
conflict are likely to be contingent on a set of economic and political conditions
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that determine adaptation capacity [BBK12]. In the context of social situations,
positive and negative forms of religious coping are related to positive and nega-
tive psychological adjustment to stress [AV05], and religion increases within-group
trust but also may increase mistrust and conflict with external groups [AG12].
Demographic structures play a role where, for example, violence and war connects
the low social status of women and gender inequality to conflicts ranging from
international aggression to civil war [Hvi12].
Instead of pursuing direct causes of food riots, an indirect path is explored to
evaluate the threat arising from food riots by introducing a basal characteristic
index based on principal component analysis across Asian developing countries.
The index can measure the relative long term status for food security between
countries, but cannot capture the temporal evolution of conflict. Therefore, the
concept of flow of anger is introduced to represent the temporal dimension in
each country. The index represents the change in the propensity for violence
that is based on the country’s basal characteristic index. Finally, by applying
Richardson’s index system [RZ13] for threat severity, trigger potency and policy
effectiveness, we fuse these five variables (i.e. basal characteristic index, dynamic
factors index, threat severity index, trigger potency index and policy effective-
ness index) into a three-dimensional first-order autonomous differential equation
system.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.1 presents previous models on food-
related conflicts prediction. Section 5.2 summarizes the Asian Food Security Risk
Engine. Section 5.3 describes the basal characteristic index by applying principal
component analysis that includes the data sources and reports summary statistics.
Section 5.4 constructs the dynamic factors index by introducing the concept of
the flow of anger. Section 5.5 presents the threat-trigger-policy nexus model and
its parameters, and section 5.6 describes the results for parameter estimation
and interprets them. Section 5.7 demonstrates the validation of the model, and
section 5.8 discusses the findings and concludes.
5.1 Methodology and Previous Literature
In econometrics, a static model is a time series model where only contemporaneous
explanatory variables affect the dependent variable, while a dynamic model is a
time series model where no further lags of either the dependent variable or the
explanatory variables help to explain the mean of the dependent variable. From
a system dynamics point of view, solving a dynamic model means determining
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how much material or information has accumulated in each of a system’s stocks2
at every point in time [Rad11]. This can be accomplished in one of two ways
- analytically or via simulation. Linear dynamic models can be solved either
way. Nonlinear models, except for a few special cases, can only be solved via
simulation whereas, static models concentrate on modeling a closed system, and
estimate the character of the future observation is the same as estimating any
existed observation.
Static models concentrate on the finding of possible explanations for the de-
pendent variable, such as unrests, conflicts, riots, and wars, including food-related
ones.
There exists the possibility that civil unrest activities, across countries and
over long time periods, are governed by universal mechanisms and that social
unrest contagion is governed by the same mechanisms despite the idiosyncrasies
of individual countries and geographic regions [Bra12]. This has been explored
by using the modified tail-weighted Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic (wKS), defined
as the maximum distance between the cumulative distribution functions of the
observed data and the fitted simulation model.
Both high and low food prices hurt the poor [SS12]. In low income countries3
increases in the international food price leads to a significant increase in the
incidence of anti-government demonstrations, riots, and civil conflict. In high
income countries variations in the international food prices have no significant
effects on measures of intra-state conflict [AB11].
Food price changes also have recently been linked to riots and political unrest,
and civil unrest is correlated, not to food price volatility, but to food price spikes
[Bus10, SPD+11, LBBY11, Bel11, Gou13]. The causal relationship between food
prices and political unrest is studied by regressing the level of political unrest in
a particular month on the food price level, three-month food price volatility, and
political unrest in the previous month [Bel11]. The causal relationship between
food prices and the incidence of natural disasters is studied by regressing the food
price level on the number of natural disasters, three-month food price volatility,
and political unrest in the previous month [Bel11].
2Stocks, which are sometimes referred to as “levels” or “states”, accumulate (i.e. sum up)
the information or material that flows into and out of them. Stocks are thus responsible for
decoupling flows, creating delays, preserving system memory, and altering the time shape of
flows. Flows of information or material enter and exit a system’s stocks and, in so doing, create
a system’s dynamics. Stated differently, the net flow into or out of a stock is the stock’s rate of
change. When human decision making is represented in a system dynamics model, it appears in
the system’s flow equations. Mathematically, a system’s flow equations are ordinary differential
equations and their format determines whether or not a system is linear or non-linear.
3The group of low income countries is identified using the World Development Indicators
(WDI) classification scheme and includes both countries classified by the World Bank as Low
Income as well as those classified as Lower Middle Income.
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The dominant causes of food price increases are investor speculation on com-
modity markets and conversion of corn to ethanol. These two are the most
prominent of six possible factors including (a) weather, particularly droughts in
Australia, (b) increasing demand for meat in the developing world, especially in
China and India, (c) biofuels, especially corn ethanol in the US and biodiesel in
Europe, (d) speculation by investors seeking financial gain on the commodities
markets, (e) currency exchange rates, and (f) linkage between oil and food prices.
These factors were studied by reconstructing a supply and demand equilibrium
price model with Walrasian adjustment [LBYBBY11].
The effect of financial speculation on food price increase or food price volatil-
ity is very controversial. In effect, besides the above argument [LBYBBY11]
that investor speculation causes food price rises, there are also claims that un-
precedented buying pressure from new financial index investors created a massive
bubble in agricultural futures prices at various times in recent years, and finan-
cial index investors were one of the main drivers of spikes in food commodity
prices that have occurred since 2007. For example, a technical report published
by the International Food Policy Research Institute4 When speculation matters,
a briefing note shown by srfood5 Food Commodities Speculation and Food Price
Crises. Regulation to reduce the risks of price volatility, and a policy paper devel-
oped by Oxfam6 Not a Game: Speculation vs Food Security: Regulating financial
markets to grow a better future. However, the argument that buying pressure
from financial index investment in recent years did not cause massive bubbles in
agricultural futures prices has been also considered [AIG13].
Climate change may undermine global food security and increase human con-
flicts [CA79, HMC11, SFT+12, SBK+12, HBM13]. Food production in middle
income countries was found to be especially vulnerable to droughts by using a
quantitative harvest vulnerability index based on annual soil moisture and grain
production data as the dependent variable in a Linear Mixed Effects model with
national scale socio-economic data as the independent variables [SFT+12]. Higher
temperatures and lower rainfalls have little effect in rich countries but substan-
tially reduce economic growth and have wide-ranging effects in poor nations,
reducing agricultural output, industrial output, and aggregate investment, and
increasing political instability [DJO08].
Dynamic models, based on static modeling, are supposed to reflect the sys-
4The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) is an international agricultural
research centre founded in the early 1970s to improve the understanding of national agricultural
and food policies to promote the adoption of innovations in agricultural technology.
5The srfood is a Special Rapporteur who works for the United Nations and reports on the
right to food.
6Oxfam is an international confederation of 17 organizations working in approximately 90
countries worldwide to find solutions to poverty and related injustice around the world.
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tem’s change across a time scale. Food-related production, consumption, short-
ages and riots can be viewed as an ecosystem that may respond in a smooth,
continuous way to changing conditions or may switch abruptly to a contrasting
alternative stable state.
Recent application of analytical procedures to various aspects of non-equilibrium
dynamics that involves economics [Set98, Kee03, GKLO06, Cou12, Kee13], soci-
ology [Eps99], ecology [SBB+09, BWAJ+10, MB10, FL13], and physics [Cro99,
Kee03, Dew05, GKLO06, Guj10, Ves12], provides some capacity to quantify pat-
terns. In the context of ecosystem behavior, for instance, the following compo-
nents have broad application: (1) dramatic ecosystem change may result from
small changes in conditions or drivers; (2) these changes are not readily reversed
by proportional changes to the conditions or drivers; and (3) ecosystem resilience
is altered as a result of these changes [SCF+01]. Also, catastrophe theory studies
endogenous discontinuities in certain kinds of dynamical systems that arise as
given control variables change continuously [RJ11a].
Considering the lack of static models and the insufficiency of application of
nonlinear dynamical models, we identify the basal characters and dynamic factors
based on the previous literature, and design a nonlinear dynamic model to predict
the Asian food security risk.
5.2 An Asian Food Security Risk Engine
An Asian Food Security Risk Engine is being developed as a computable model
for scenario planning and for predicting, one month ahead, the threat severity
to internal security and stability occurring within any of 27 Asian developing
countries7.
The risk engine uses a basal characteristic index to distinguish countries from
each other. Next, the risk engine uses a dynamic factors index to measure the
flow of anger, i.e. to describe the dynamics of a poor Asian nation’s stock of anger
based on basal characteristic index. Finally, based on dynamical stocks of anger,
7Referring “composition of macro geographical (continental) regions, geographical sub-
regions, and selected economic and other groupings” by United Nations [Uni10], the 27 Asian
developing countries consist of 3 Caucasus countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia); 5 Cen-
tral Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan); 7 South
Asian countries (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka); 9 South
East Asian countries (Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philip-
pines, Thailand, Vietnam); and 3 East Asian countries (China, Mongolia, North Korea). The
country sets exclude 15 West Asian countries (Bahrain, Cyprus, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, State of Palestine, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, United
Arab Emirates, Yemen) and 2 South Asian countries (Afghanistan, Iran) due to selective geo-
graphic factors, and developed Asian countries (Brunei, Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, Macao,
South Korea) because of economic factors.
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threats take place once the stocks break through the threshold, triggers amplify
the anger, and policies give a positive or negative feedback. At the same time,
triggers and policies are dynamical, depending on the threats and on themselves.
At the heart of the model that drives the risk engine lies a three-dimensional
first-order differential equation system that calculates the threat effects, as caused
by the relevant basal, dynamic, trigger, and policy variables. Time lags that
recognize such facts as local prices taking one month to reflect world prices have
been built in. There are 27 sets of such equations, one differential equation system
per country.
As for the calculation of basal characteristic index across countries, data col-
lection ranges from 1990 to 2010 annually, and the average values are used to
measure cross-section components. Cross-country difference measurement de-
pends on principal components analysis (PCA) that also gives a way to identify
the key factors that reflect the initial stock of anger for each country.
As for selection of dynamic factors determining the flow of anger, in this
model, both food price and energy price are included, given that food price is a
double-edged sword for the poor [SS12], although a recent tendency shows higher
correlation between food price and energy price.
As for evaluation or data collection on threats, triggers and policies for each
country in a given month, they comprise only those due to food-related prob-
lems, as occurred from January 2006 to December 2012. Security problems due
to border disputes and tribal, ethnic, religious, self-determination, or separatist
movements within Asian countries were excluded from the analysis, unless they
were responsible for triggering food-related threats.
Finally, threats, triggers, and policies data over the period 2006-2008 are used
for parameter estimation, while the 2009-2012 data are reserved for hypothesis
testing.
5.3 The Basal Characteristic Index: Initial Stock
of Anger
A basal characteristic index is used to distinguish countries from each other,
in order to measure the basis for the food-related problems coming from both
cross-country and within-country variation.
5.3.1 Development of the Dataset
In several Asian developing countries, the polity seems almost permanently to
inhabit the first, second, etc. rung on a kind of “threats ladder”. This initial
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“rung number” (with its associated “anger thermometer reading”) is hypothesized
to be due to certain, almost permanent, enviro-socio-politico-economic structural
features, termed the basal characteristic index (see Table 5.1 for the variables
and their categories and sources, and Table 5.2 for the definitions of variables) of
that nation. These may include such long-duration features as autocratic ruling
elites, repressive regimes and lack of press freedoms.
Table 5.1: Basal characteristic index: sources of variables
Category Variable Source
Economic Gini Index UNDP
Economic GDP % in Agriculture WDI, World Bank
Economic GDP growth per capita WDI, World Bank
Economic GDP per capita PPP WDI, World Bank
Ecological Distance to the equator Bansal and Ochoa [BO11]
Ecological Geographic group Author calculation
Ecological % Agricultural land FAO
Ecological % Arable land FAO
Ecological Cereal WDI, World Bank
Ecological Precipitation WDI, World Bank
Political Political system rank-
ing8
Author calculation
Political Press freedom rating Freedom House
Political Polity29 Polity IV project
Social Culture index Williamson and Mathers [WM11]
Social % Adult literacy UNESCO
Social Total adult literacy rate UNESCO
Social % Population under 25 US Census Bureau
Social Total age dependency US Census Bureau
Social % Males aged 15-24 WDI, World Bank
Social % Urban population WDI, World Bank
Social Fertility rate WDI, World Bank
Social Mortality rate WDI, World Bank
Social Population density WDI, World Bank
Social Telephone lines WDI, World Bank
Social Google news hits Author calculation
8The authors assign the rankings between 0 and 10 discretely to Asian countries in means
of the similarity and difference between two selected countries.
9The Polity2 variable from the Polity IV project measures the level of democracy, which is
identical to the polity variable with the exception of periods of interruption, interregnum, and
transition [PN10].
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The time series data coming from the United Nations Statistics Division and
World Bank are almost all available over the period 1990-2010. Hence, the average
over this period is available and provides a stable basal characteristic index.
However, some political variables cannot be accessed annually, and it is still
reasonable to measure a basal characteristic index by using data of a specific year
due to decades of stability for almost every country.
Table 5.2: Basal characteristic index: definitions of variables
Variable Definition
Gini Index Gini Index in 2005.
GDP % in Agriculture Share of Agricultural GDP in GDP in 2000.
GDP growth per capita GDP per capita growth (annual %). Average over
1990-2010, when available.
GDP per capita PPP GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international
dollar). Average over 1990-2010, when available.
Distance to the equator Countries grouped by distance to the equator.
Geographic group Central Asia = 1, East Asia = 2, South East Asia
= 3, South Asia = 4, Caucasus = 5.
% Agricultural land Share of Agricultural area in Land area. Average
over 1990-2010, when available.
% Arable land Share of Arable area in Agricultural area (in %).
Average over 1990-2010, when available.
Cereal Cereal yield (kg per hectare). Average over 1990-
2010, when available.
Precipitation Precipitation (mm pa) in 2008.
Political ranking Political system ranks assigned by authors (0 to
10).
Press freedom Index of quality of the legal environment.
Polity2 Political stability indicator institutionalized autoc-
racy minus democracy score (-10 to 10).
Culture index The sum of three positive beliefs (control, respect,
trust) minus the negative belief (obedience). The
index uses PCA to extract the common variation
among all four components, and then it is normal-
ized to range between 0 and 10.
% Adult literacy Population share of literate people aged 15 and
above. Average over 1990-2010, when available.
Total adult literacy Number of literate people aged 15 and above. Av-
erage over 1990-2010, when available.
% Population under 25 Population share of males under 25. Average over
1990-2010, when available.
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Variable Definition
Total age dependency Number of persons under age 15 plus persons aged
65 or older per one hundred persons 15 to 64 in
2009. Average over 1990-2010, when available.
% Males aged 15-24 Population share of males aged 15-24 years. Aver-
age over 1990-2010, when available.
% Urban population Percentage of total population living in cities. Av-
erage over 1990-2010, when available.
Fertility rate Number of children per woman. Average over 1990-
2010, when available.
Mortality rate Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births). Aver-
age over 1990-2010, when available.
Population density Population density (persons per km2) in 2009. Av-
erage over 1990-2010, when available.
Telephone lines Number of telephone connections. Average over
1990-2010, when available.
Google news hits The annual amount of news item hits by Google
search engine (<country name> AND food AND
riots OR protests OR strikes). Average over 1990-
2010.
The analysis of basal characteristic index was based on Table 5.1 above, i.e.
a dataset of 25 variables drawn from the World Development Indicators (WDI)
database of the World Bank, plus other databases published by the FAO, the
UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the US Cen-
sus Bureau, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the author’s calculations,
describing the degrees of difference for 27 Asian developing countries. Indicator
values were computed as 21-year averages over the period 1990-2010. Table 5.3
below provides summary statistics from across 27 nations for the 25 variables in
four categories, i.e. ecological (6 variables), political (3 variables), economic (4
variables), and social (12 variables).
Table 5.3: Summary statistics for basal characteristic index
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
% Agriculture GDP 26.4291 13.1768 8.5990 57.2387
GDPPC growth 3.4641 2.5786 -1.5714 9.6460
GDPPC PPP 2754.5270 2145.1273 731.2237 10451.6131
Gini 0.3823 0.0582 0.1850 0.4850
Agricultural land 41.1534 19.9840 7.9584 78.0413
Arable land 44.8323 28.7824 0.9155 91.1085
Cereal 2580.3924 953.0950 831.5333 4949.6944
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Distance to the Equator 2.0741 0.8286 1.0000 3.0000
Geographic Group 3.0000 1.2710 1.0000 5.0000
Precipitation 1338.5185 849.0592 161.0000 2875.0000
Political System Ranking 5.9630 4.1183 1.0000 12.0000
Polity2 -0.4466 6.2858 -9.0000 9.7647
Press Freedom Rating 67.0000 18.4161 33.0000 99.0000
% Adult literacy 82.7189 20.9083 38.5160 99.9983
% Males aged 15-24 years 9.8421 0.8915 7.4684 12.2168
% Population under 25 53.0507 7.2391 36.0155 62.1363
% Urban population 37.2759 15.6402 13.3929 65.2271
Culture index 4.5807 1.6224 2.1100 8.0400
Fertility rate 3.1329 1.1112 1.7488 6.5176
Mortality rate 45.0337 20.3410 8.5125 80.8625
Population density 200.3118 291.4693 1.7193 1246.2223
Telephone lines 6.4895 5.1794 0.1853 18.3171
Total adult literacy rate 78.9598 26.7680 0.8605 99.9983
Total age dependency 53.6528 11.6686 39.3980 92.1152
Google news hits 59.7743 86.0192 2.4762 347.2381
5.3.2 Principal Components Analysis
Principal components analysis (PCA) is used to extract the common factors
underlying variations in the basal characteristic index of 27 Asian developing
countries in the period 1990 to 2010. Whenever the characteristics for different
countries changed independently, we inferred that they were driven by country-
specific factors. Whenever they moved together, we inferred that all countries are
subject to common factors. The raw data used to construct the basal character-
istic (BC) index comprised that set of n = 25 basal characteristics, variables or
indicators listed in Table 5.1 above. These were standardized, i.e. measured as
the deviations from the means and divided by the standard deviations. Not all
trend patterns are alike, but they do appear to comprise relatively independent
components.
A correction for correlated system noise in the 25 Basal indicators is applied.
In computing the principal components (PCs) we reduced the dimension of the
data by finding those few (m < n) orthogonal linear combinations of the n =
25 original variables that exhibit the largest variance. The purpose of PCA is
to cut through variation within the sample to see whether certain members of
the dataset of Basal variables are truly related to one another. Briefly, PCA is
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a statistical method for extracting those factors or components responsible for
the co-movement of a group of variables, and it allows the synthesizing of such
information.
By running the PCA, we integrated the 25 ecological, social, political, and
economic indicator values into a single BC Index, which then was normalized to
range from 1 to 100 (cf. minimum to maximum base stock of anger) for 27 Asian
developing countries. An index that aggregates more than one indicator facilitates
the use of complex information by non-experts. For example, decision-makers
need a global, long term, “first-cut” evaluation of food security vulnerability, but
they may not have the knowledge necessary to understand the complexity of, and
trade-offs among, the components of complex social-political-economic-ecological
systems. These are easily synthesized by an over-arching metric like the BC Index
[CB10].
Differently from conventional food security index, we did not rely on some
arbitrary and ad-hoc selection of weights/loadings to compute the aggregate mea-
sure for each country. Instead, we determined these weights using PCA. In a nut-
shell, the procedure involved an orthogonal linear transformation of n possibly-
correlated indicators into a far smaller number m of uncorrelated variables called
principal components. The first PC accounts for as much of the variation in the
original data as possible, with each succeeding component accounting for as much
of the remaining variation as possible.
The matrix of basal characteristics sub-indexes (SI) can be written as follows,
where the ith row represents one of the 27 Asian nations and the jth column
represents one of the 25 sub-indexes of basal characteristics:
SI1,1 SI1,2 · · · SI1,25
SI2,1 SI2,2 · · · SI2,25
...
...
. . .
...
SI27,1 SI27,2 · · · SI27,25
 (5.1)
The weighting vectors are referred to as eigenvectors in PCA. The overarching
index can be expressed in terms of these eigenvectors as follows: the ith country’s
basal characteristic index (BCi) is calculated as
BCi =
n∑
j=1
SCOREj × (SIij − SIj)
SDj
(5.2)
where SCOREj is the factor score for factor j, SIij is the ith country’s basal
characteristics sub-index for factor j and SIj and SDj are the mean and standard
deviation, respectively, of the factor j variable over all 27 countries. To compute
the factor score for a given case for a given factor, one takes the case’s standardized
88
score on each variable, multiplied by the corresponding factor loading of the
variable for the given factor, and sum these products.
5.3.3 Empirical Results
Once defining BCi for the ith country as a combination of the first NPC principal
components, and choosing NPC = 4, Table 5.4 below shows that the first principal
component (PC1) of the basal characteristic dataset is positively correlated (=
0.6612) with annual GDP per capita growth. The second principal component
(PC2) of the basal characteristic data was positively correlated (= 0.6175) with
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollar). The third principal
component (PC3) of the basal characteristic data was positively correlated (=
0.4991) with annual GDP per capita growth and positively correlated (= 0.4969)
with the share of agricultural GDP in GDP. The fourth principal component
(PC4) of the basal characteristic data was positively correlated (= 0.5993) with
the cereal yield productivity (kg per hectare) and positively correlated (= 0.4339)
with geographic group.
Table 5.4: Principal component analysis of 27 Asian developing countries in the
25 basal characteristics
Characteristics Vectors
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4
Eigenvalue 6.6910 3.7772 3.6360 2.0140
% of variance explained 26.7639 15.1089 14.5439 8.0559
Correlations:
% Agriculture GDP -0.3129 0.0938 0.4991 -0.2391
GDPPC growth 0.6612 -0.2467 -0.4969 -0.2354
GDPPC PPP 0.3696 0.6175 -0.2534 0.2971
Gini 0.0559 0.0486 -0.3201 -0.1656
Agricultural land -0.4214 0.3837 0.2796 -0.0517
Arable land 0.0108 0.2245 -0.2232 -0.2380
Cereal 0.1438 -0.0514 -0.1599 0.5993
Distance to the Equator 0.1129 0.4801 0.0369 0.2881
Geographic Group 0.0997 0.1867 0.0866 -0.4339
Precipitation -0.0374 -0.1533 -0.0336 0.0069
Political System Ranking 0.0436 0.0495 0.3633 -0.1208
Polity2 0.0479 0.0352 0.1567 0.2490
Press Freedom Rating 0.1925 0.1368 -0.0478 -0.0337
% Adult literacy -0.1054 0.1458 -0.0177 0.0034
% Males aged 15-24 years 0.1494 0.0840 0.0099 0.0166
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Characteristics Vectors
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4
% Population under 25 -0.0709 0.0507 -0.0625 0.0152
% Urban population 0.0682 -0.0487 0.0566 -0.0393
Culture index 0.0914 0.0163 0.0595 -0.0201
Fertility rate -0.0983 -0.0104 0.0170 0.0253
Mortality rate 0.0138 -0.0053 0.0495 0.0309
Population density -0.0043 -0.0336 0.0108 0.0085
Telephone lines -0.0129 0.0146 -0.0067 -0.0085
Total adult literacy rate 0.0071 -0.0032 0.0299 0.0048
Total age dependency 0.0030 -0.0090 -0.0009 0.0035
Google News Hits 0.0026 -0.0068 -0.0004 -0.0010
The first two rows of the table refer to the principal components. The eigen-
values and the explained variance proportions are displayed. The variance pro-
portion is calculated as the ratio of each eigenvalue to the sum of all eigenvalues.
All other rows display the weights corresponding to each principal component
(eigenvector corresponding to each principal component). Additionally, the em-
pirical results identify the key factors that contribute the initial stock of anger in
the top, i.e. annual GDP per capita growth, GDP per capita measured by the
purchasing power parity (PPP) method, the share of agricultural GDP in total
GDP, the cereal yield productivity, and geographic group (Central Asia, East
Asia, South East Asia, South Asia, and Caucasus).
Table 5.5 below shows the basal characteristic index, where Column “Origi-
nal BC” is the basal characteristic that originates from Equation (5.2), Column
“Standardized BC” developed by standardizing the original basal characteristic
by standard deviation, and Column “Index for BC” arose by normalizing stan-
dardized basal characteristic index to the range 1-100, where 1 means minimal
initial stock of anger, and 100 maximal.
Table 5.5: Basal characteristic index
Country Original BC Standardized BC Index for BC
Armenia 61.0141 0.7536 28
Azerbaijan 80.1432 0.9899 22
Bangladesh -92.0386 -1.1368 77
Bhutan -67.3081 -0.8314 69
Cambodia -58.5554 -0.7232 66
China 144.2426 1.7816 2
East Timor -165.7366 -2.0471 100
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Country Original BC Standardized BC Index for BC
Georgia 55.3750 0.6840 30
India -75.7708 -0.9359 71
Indonesia -18.2078 -0.2249 53
Kazakhstan 93.3358 1.1528 18
Kyrgyzstan 34.3488 0.4243 37
Laos -20.0938 -0.2482 54
Malaysia -34.5000 -0.4261 58
Maldives -82.5723 -1.0199 74
Mongolia 21.9718 0.2714 40
Myanmar 57.0323 0.7044 29
Nepal -99.7901 -1.2326 79
North Korea 146.2851 1.8068 1
Pakistan -89.3587 -1.1037 76
Philippines -78.8794 -0.9743 72
Sri Lanka -26.1944 -0.3235 56
Tajikistan 0.2280 0.0028 47
Thailand -13.2331 -0.1634 52
Turkmenistan 87.4111 1.0797 20
Uzbekistan 84.7808 1.0472 21
Vietnam 56.0703 0.6925 30
5.4 Dynamic Factors Index: The Flow of Anger
In thermal physics, Fourier law states that the rate of heat flow depends on a
temperature difference, but it also depends on the resistance or conductance of the
intervening medium. For the simplest condition, Fourier’s equation is represented
by
q = −k d
dx
T (5.3)
where k is the thermal conductivity, T is the temperature, x is the spatial dis-
placement, and q is the rate of heat flow.
By analogy, Dynamic Factors DF1, DF2, . . . , DFn are viewed as temperature
(T ) and the basal characteristic BCi as thermal conductivity (k). For spatial
displacement (x), we can use temporal displacement (t) instead, that is
FAi(t) = −BCi
n∑
k=1
d
dt
DFk (5.4)
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Figure 5.1: FAO food price index and IMF crude oil price index
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where heat flow (q) is replaced by FAi, the flow of anger that alters the polity’s
initial stock of anger, i.e. stock of discontent, in country i. When n = 2, so that
DF1(t) is the FAO food price index
10 and DF2(t) is the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) crude oil price index11, Figure 5.1 shows the period for further pa-
rameter estimation and hypothesis testing, that is a time series of the index from
January 2006 to December 2012 where index for January 2006 = 100. The inset
figure shows a time series of the index from January 1990 to June 2013, which is
the latest available data, where the index for January 1990 = 100. We are aware
that there is a strong correlation between the FAO food price index and the IMF
crude oil price Index. However, we argue that less analysis on cause and effect
between food price and energy price would lead to the potential insufficiency on
dynamic regression if we omitted the energy price.
The flow of anger FAi(t), i = 1, 2, . . . , 27, t ∈ [01/2006, 12/2012] can be
tracked as plotted against time in Figure 5.2 below following Equation (5.4).
10FAO food price index takes the average of five monthly spot price indexes (meat, dairy,
cereals, oils and sugar) covering a total of 55 commodity quotations deemed representative of
international food prices. Local food price indexes in developing countries track this global food
price index closely, with a time lag of one month [OCC11].
11IMF crude oil price index is average of three spot prices: Dated Brent, West Texas Inter-
mediate, and the Dubai Fateh.
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Figure 5.2: The flow of anger of 27 Asian developing countries in the period 2006
to 2012
5.5 The Differential Equation System
Differential equation systems often are complex and always are dynamic. The
flip of a complex dynamical system from one state to another is called its “tip-
ping point” and there is increasingly popular interest from the fields of ecol-
ogy and ecosystem [MLS08, Cos09, SBB+09, WDL+12, SCL+12, FSJ13, SLH13],
economics [LT12, FKMO13, DE13], sociology [US05, LGK12, SWD12], physics
[Sor02, Sor03, SH03, SDGA04, Ves12] and biology [DMB+12, FL13]. There is a
potential for trigger events to push elements of the food-related civil unrest system
past a critical threshold or tipping point, beyond which they would change state
dramatically, leading to larger-scale threat severity. Different types of threats
have qualitatively different effects on governments’ choice of policies.
While many approaches to explaining civil strife hypothesise mechanisms that
operate at short time scales [PSX07, Bel11, LBBY11, HMC11, Bra12, BBK12,
SBK+12, OWL+12, HBM13], we propose that the underlying cause of food-
related troubles often should be searched for months earlier. In my view, there
can be a progressively increasing build-up of external turbulence upon the inter-
nal socio-economic environment, which translates into accelerating fluctuations
of the local food price along a rising trend. According to this point of view, a
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specific trigger event is not always the spark that immediately sets off a confla-
gration. A food riot also can occur because the society has entered an unstable
phase, so almost any small disturbance may have ignited this instability.
There is an analogy with an active volcano: this very unstable situation even-
tually will lead to its eruption, as the result of a small earthquake or any tiny
change of heat flux. The eruption is fundamentally due to the unstable situation,
with the instantaneous cause of the eruption being secondary. In the same way,
the increasing discontent and the growing instability of the society close to such a
critical point can explain why attempts to model the local (country-level) origins
of food-related civil strife have been so diverse. We explore here the concept that
a threat fundamentally has an endogenous origin, with exogenous shocks serv-
ing only as instantaneous triggers. As a consequence, the origin of threats is far
more subtle than often thought because such situations progressively build up in
the society as a whole: there is a self-organizing process at work, which could
be termed a “systemic instability”, a frequently-used concept in financial system
studies [CMV09, HM11, HK12b, AKM12, May13].
Real complex systems are almost never in equilibrium, i.e. frequently they
may be “out of equilibrium” [Art99, RJ99, SFS+09] and behave in non-stationary
ways, where the complexity of the situation forces elements in system to reflect
and update their behavior according to their performance. For instance, govern-
ments may modify the food policies to moderate the threat of food riots and the
situation can fluctuate within the domains of attraction of one or more system
states [EA96, KMC10, FJPS04].
A “regime shift” occurs when a system crosses a threshold, after which it is
governed by a different set of processes and feedbacks [FZG+10]. The presence of
internal system feedbacks also explains why regime shifts exhibit hysteresis: once
the system is in a particular regime it tends to remain there, even if the change
in inputs that caused the shift is reduced or removed. Because different sets of
dominant feedbacks are associated with different regimes, the critical threshold for
a shift from Regime 1 to 2 often differs from the critical threshold for a return shift
from Regime 2 to 1. In the food security case, internal system feedbacks consist
of threats accumulated through international dynamic factors getting stacked on
top of the underlying basal characteristic index of each country; also triggers that
abruptly change the system and policies that reduce the influence of the inputs
as internal system feedbacks. There is a situation in which, when one regime
has low food security risk, the other regime cannot smoothly reach the regimes
having high food security risk. Food security risk will increase suddenly if the
trigger reaches the threshold.
According to Colin Richardson and William Zhao [RZ13], firstly, we define
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Figure 5.3: Threat severity of 27 Asian developing countries in the period 2006
to 2012
the threat severity as a ladder from 1 to 10 where as the rung number increases
the threat severity rises following (1) protests, e.g. posters, petitions, on-line
anger, marches, rallies, sit-ins, occupations, barricades, effigy burnings (minor
property damage, injuries); (2) extensive protests, strikes (minor property dam-
age, injuries), and/or sieges; (3) violent protests, and/or extensive strikes (major
property damage, injuries); (4) violent protests, and/or violent strikes (1+ killed
in one month); (5) riots (10+ killed in one month); (6) extensive riots (100+
killed in one month), and/or mutiny; (7) mass riots (500+ killed in one month),
and/or putsch; (8) insurgency, rebellion, and/or coup d’etat; (9) extensive rebel-
lion, and/or revolution; and (10) extensive revolution, and/or civil war. Figure
5.3 shows a monthly time series of the threat severity over the period 2006-2012
for 27 Asian developing countries.
Secondly, we define the trigger potency as a ladder from 1 to 10 where as
the rung number increases the trigger potency rises following (1) land grabs,
price rises, lower subsidies/rations, and/or urban wage cuts announced; (2) in-
tensification of fiscal, monetary or trade discipline, i.e. austerity or free trade
or privatization; and government limits or bans entry of external food aid; (3)
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Figure 5.4: Trigger potency of 27 Asian developing countries in the period 2006
to 2012
C-list citizen(s) TAJH12; curfew declared; and/or trigger #1 implemented; (4)
head of state/government attempts to extend term of office; local media crack-
down; state of emergency declared; and/or so-called anti-terrorism law(s) passed
or toughened; (5) B-list citizen(s) TAJH; unrest in the military, security or police
forces; Internet selectively blocked or shut down; elections postponed; and/or
foreign media crackdown; (6) opposition political parties banned; military coup;
opposition fears rigged election; foreign journalists denied entry; and/or state
purchases food from domestic sources to boost government reserve stocks; (7) A-
list citizen(s) TAJH; government or business corruption scandal; and/or head of
state/government decrees direct rule; (8) C-list citizen(s) KSEDT13; and/or mas-
sacre(s) of ¡ 10 women/children or ¡50 men; (9) B-list citizen(s) KSEDT; and/or
massacre(s) of 50+ men; and (10) A-list citizen(s) KSEDT; and/or massacre(s)
of 10+ women/children. Figure 5.4 shows a monthly time series of the trigger
potency over the period 2006-2012 for 27 Asian developing countries.
Finally, we define the policy effectiveness as a ladder from 1 to 10 where as
the rung number increases the trigger potency rises following (1) state switches
military/police/civil service, etc. rations from expensive to cheaper staples; state
12TAJH is short for targeted, arrested, jailed, or on hunger strike
13KSEDT is short for killed, suicide, executed, disappeared, or tortured.
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limits food purchases per shop visit; and/or state orders smaller portions served
in all cafes and restaurants; (2) state controls food prices by fiat; and/or state
rations food consumption; (3) impose/lift penalties for food smuggling, price
fixing, hoarding, cheating, price gouging, etc.; and/or state subsidizes whole-
sale food prices; (4) state of emergency lifted; state subsidizes retail food prices;
and/or state encourages switching of diets from imported to domestically pro-
duced food; (5) police/military/security punished for actions against protesters;
targeted transfers of cash, cash for work or subsidized food to the poorest fam-
ilies; and/or control panic buying of food; (6) state suspends purchasing food
from domestic sources of supply; state auctions more food from government re-
serve stocks; and/or state rationalizes food reserves procurement from overseas;
(7) head of state/government lifts direct rule; release surviving C-list citizens
from prison; crackdown on government/business corruption; raise wages and/or
employment of urban workers; ban/limit futures trading and commodity specula-
tion in food; raise interest rates or required reserve ratios of banks; and/or state
gifts food from government reserve stocks to local WFP/NGOs to distribute; (8)
release surviving B-list citizens from prison; remove/lower import tariffs, quotas
and/or domestic taxes on food; state purchases more food imports; and/or state
accepts more food aid from donors; (9) change head of state/government; adopt
new constitution; release surviving A-list citizens from prison; and/or ban/limit
food exports by raising food export taxes, imposing food export quotas or setting
minimum export prices; and (10) intervention by UN, adjacent nation(s), etc.;
complete change of government; ban/limit foreign land grabs or conversion of
farmland for non-agricultural purposes; and/or other actions to increase domes-
tic food production, e.g. debt relief/waiver, cheaper credit, minimum support
prices, subsidized inputs for farming or other key activities along the food supply
chain. Figure 5.5 shows a monthly time series of the policy effectiveness over the
period 2006-2012 for 27 Asian developing countries.
Given the threat severity index TSi(t), trigger potency index TPi(t), and pol-
icy effectiveness index PEi(t) at time t in country i, we assume that the change
in threat severity depends on 4 factors, with 2 of these 4 factors being weighted
by the flow of anger. The first is previous threat severity itself accelerated by
previous trigger potency, and we assume that the rate of increase is proportional
to the current threat severity. Thus, when the trigger is more potent, the previous
threat contributes more. Then, the previous threat severity is decayed by previ-
ous policy effectiveness, and we assume that the rate of decrease is proportional to
the current threat severity. Thus, when policy is more effective, previous threat
contributes less. Next we assume that the change in threat severity is also propor-
tional to the trigger potency, but weighted by the flow of anger. The modification
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Figure 5.5: Policy effectiveness of 27 Asian developing countries in the period
2006 to 2012
assumes that if the flow of anger is low, then the impact of trigger potency will be
reduced in proportion. For simplicity we assume the interdependency is linear.
Finally, we assume that the change in threat severity is proportional to policy
effectiveness. Because policy has a relatively slow impact on social dynamics, we
assume that the change in threat severity depends on the current month’s value
for the policy effectiveness. However, we assume that policy has a limited impact
on threat severity as the flow of anger increases. To reproduce this behavior,
we represent the weighting of policy effectiveness by flow of anger using the Hill
equation that describes the non-linear saturation of biochemical reactions. Thus
when the flow of anger is low, the impact of policy is low. However, as flow of
anger increases, the impact of policy does not increase in proportion, but the
weighting increases more slowly up to a maximum value. Therefore, the threat
severity equation is written as
dTSi
dt
= α1FAi(t)TPi(t) + α2TPi(t− 1)TSi(t− 1)
+
α3FA
2
i (t)
FA2i (t) + F
2
PEi(t) + α4PEi(t− 1)TSi(t− 1) (5.5)
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where F = 10 is constant comprising the Hill function to affect the acceleration
of the Hill transformation part, α1 is the rate at which the acceleration of current
trigger potency by the flow of anger is added onto TSi; α2 is the rate at which the
previous threat severity (accelerated by previous trigger potency) is added onto
TSi; α3 is the rates at which the current month’s policy effectiveness, weighted
by the Hill transformation of the flow of anger, is added on to TSi; and α4 is
the rate at which the previous threat severity (decayed by the previous policy
effectiveness) is deleted onto TSi.
Furthermore, we assume that the change in trigger potency depends on 3
factors. The first is the level of trigger potency itself, and we assume that the rate
of increase in the trigger potency is proportional to the current trigger potency.
Next we assume that the change in trigger potency is also proportional to the
current and previous month’s value for the trigger potency, but weighted by policy
effectiveness. The modification assumes that if the policy is effective, then the
impact of trigger potency will be reduced in proportion. For simplicity we assume
the interdependency is linear. Therefore, the trigger potency equation is written
as
dTPi
dt
= β1TPi(t) + β2TPi(t)PEi(t) + β3TPi(t− 1)PEi(t− 1) (5.6)
where β1 is the rate at which new trigger potency is added onto TPi per se.
trigger potency is assumed to grow exponentially while current and previous
policy effectiveness reduce the growth of trigger potency at the rate of β2 and β3
respectively.
Finally, we assume that the change in policy effectiveness also depends on 3
factors. The first is the level of policy effectiveness itself, and we assume that the
rate of increase in the policy effectiveness is proportional to the current policy
effectiveness. Next we assume that the change in policy effectiveness is also pro-
portional to the current and previous month’s value for the policy effectiveness,
but weighted by trigger potency. The modification assumes that if the trigger
potency is high, then the impact of policy effectiveness will be reduced in pro-
portion. For simplicity we assume the interdependency is linear. Therefore, the
policy effectiveness equation is written as
dPEi
dt
= γ1PEi(t) + γ2TPi(t)PEi(t) + γ3TPi(t− 1)PEi(t− 1) (5.7)
where γ1 is the rate at which new policy effectiveness is added onto PEi per se.
policy effectiveness is assumed to decay exponentially while current and previous
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trigger potency increase policy effectiveness at the rate of γ2 and γ3 respectively.
5.6 Parameter Estimation
The Parameter Estimation Spreadsheet in the report paper written by Colin
Richardson and William Zhao [RZ13] reveals much about the 2006-08 episode of
widespread food-related civil unrest, which affected all but 9 of the 27 countries
across 5 regions of Asia. For a start, there were 197 items or monthly mentions
of these 24 countries in the 36-month time span.
In terms of total mentions per year, there were 231 in 2006, rising to 412 in
2007 then almost doubling to 702 in 2008. This hints at how the the stock of
anger and government attempts at amelioration ramped up as the FAO world
food price index approached its first episode peak of 224.4 (nominal food price
index) in June 2008.
This section estimates the model’s parameters (i.e. those αs, βs and γs in the
above equations (5.5), (5.6), and (5.7)) using multivariate regression analysis on
data from the period 2006-08. Once a set of ideal equation parameters has been
estimated, in next section, they are re-named as coefficients to recognize they are
merely statistical approximations to the ideal numbers.
Considering that the index of threat (Figure 5.3), the index of trigger (Figure
5.4), and the index of policy (Figure 5.5) are sparse matrices (consisting of lots
of zeros), before regressing the coefficients of Threat-Trigger-Policy system, we
transfer all 0 into 1 in order to avoid the disappearance of the parts with the flow
of anger through
y = log(x+ 1) + 1 (5.8)
where x is original definition of index for threat, trigger, and policy, and y is its
transformation for clearing away zeros. We estimate αj (j = 1, 2, 3, 4), βj and γj
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(j = 1, 2, 3) by seeking the least squares solution based on
∂
(
dTSi
dt
(t)
)/
∂(FAi(t)TPi(t)) ∼ α1 (5.9a)
∂
(
dTSi
dt
(t)
)/
∂(FAi(t− 1)TPi(t− 1)) ∼ α2 (5.9b)
∂
(
dTSi
dt
(t)
)/
∂
(
FA2i (t)PEi(t)
FA2i (t) + F
2
)
∼ α3 (5.9c)
∂
(
dTSi
dt
(t)
)/
∂(PEi(t− 1)TSi(t− 1)) ∼ α4 (5.9d)
∂
(
dTPi
dt
(t)
)/
∂TPi(t) ∼ β1 (5.9e)
∂
(
dTPi
dt
(t)
)/
∂(TPi(t)PEi(t)) ∼ β2 (5.9f)
∂
(
dTPi
dt
(t)
)/
∂(TPi(t− 1)PEi(t− 1)) ∼ β3 (5.9g)
∂
(
dPEi
dt
(t)
)/
∂PEi(t) ∼ γ1 (5.9h)
∂
(
dPEi
dt
(t)
)/
∂(TPi(t)PEi(t)) ∼ γ2 (5.9i)
∂
(
dPEi
dt
(t)
)/
∂(TPi(t− 1)PEi(t− 1)) ∼ γ3 (5.9j)
Table 5.6 reports the results for the estimation of coefficients of the Threat-
Trigger-Policy system, and shows that the exponential parts for trigger, and pol-
icy have a higher R2 (between 0.71-0.73) while other parts share a similar value
of R2 (between 0.23-0.37) other than the parts for explaining the threat with the
flow of anger and its Hill transformation.
Table 5.6: Coefficients for the Threat-Trigger-Policy system. The robust t-
statistics for each estimated coefficient are given in right columns.
Coefficient Residual N R2 Adj-R2
α1 -3.59E-5 -1.94625 -0.00075 0.040575 972 0.287015 0.286237
α2 -0.31633 -19.2026 0 -0.03917 972 0 0
α3 0.039808 1.284315 -0.00112 -0.04958 972 0.001797 0.000708
α4 -0.2107 -14.9908 -0.00084 -0.04166 972 0.197002 0.196125
β1 1.504792 50.34963 0.005574 0.360212 972 0.734576 0.734286
β2 0.329378 16.77368 -0.00394 -0.14981 972 0.234981 0.234146
β3 -0.33617 -17.257 -0.00672 -0.2577 972 0.245349 0.244525
γ1 1.427 47.93961 0.001115 0.051293 972 0.715015 0.714704
γ2 0.564934 23.50268 0.007982 0.248226 972 0.376182 0.375501
101
Coefficient Residual N R2 Adj-R2
γ3 -0.52484 -21.0228 0.003431 0.102601 972 0.325457 0.324721
The results do hint that we are on the right track. There are several other op-
tions available for further development of this first attempt at a differential equa-
tion system, or for adopting some alternative, but strictly hypothesis-consistent,
equation set. The aim is to comprehensively validate the stock of discontent
hypothesis using the best possible system of equations.
5.7 Hypothesis Validation
In order to validate the stock of discontent hypothesis, we employ the data on
threat severity, trigger potency, and policy effectiveness in 27 Asian developing
countries using the same dataset belonging to Colin Richardson and William
Zhao’s report paper [RZ13], and spanning the period 2009-12, to parameterize
the differential equations (5.5), (5.6) and (5.7) according to Figure 5.3, Figure
5.4 and Figure 5.5. In terms of total mentions per year, there were 115 in 2009,
rising more than 7 times to 845 in 2010 before falling to 357 in 2011 and 201 in
2012.
The differential equation system is a one-month-ahead prediction model and
includes a one-month-lag element in order to reflect policy’s hysteresis effect, plus
the delay differential equations covering the threat severity, trigger potency, and
policy effectiveness for 48 months over the period of 2009-12. Therefore, the
tests start with the threat-trigger-policy index in December 2008, and use two
continuous months’ index values in the differential equation system to predict
the third month then compare with its true value. Finally comparison between
solutions of 48 delay differential equation system and 48-month true values for
each one of 27 countries reveals the robustness of the model.
Figure 5.6 displays the comparison of known real-world and model-simulated
threat severity. The ideal result would be distributed around the line having a
slope of 45 degrees.
As mentioned before, introducing the flow of anger combines basal characteris-
tic index and dynamic factors with the threat-trigger-policy differential equation
system, and reflects a change of anger accumulation from the aspect of viewpoint
on historical time (not ergodic time) which is difficult to be fused in a closed dif-
ferential equation system. Given the flow of anger is zero, the differential equation
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Figure 5.6: Comparison between predicted and actual threat severity with dy-
namical flow of anger
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Figure 5.7: Comparison between predicted and actual threat severity with zero
flow of anger
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system (5.5), (5.6), and (5.7) become
dTSi
dt
= α2TPi(t− 1)TSi(t− 1) + α4PEi(t− 1)TSi(t− 1) (5.10a)
dTPi
dt
= β1TPi(t) + β2TPi(t)PEi(t) + β3TPi(t− 1)PEi(t− 1) (5.10b)
dPEi
dt
= γ1PEi(t) + γ2TPi(t)PEi(t) + γ3TPi(t− 1)PEi(t− 1) (5.10c)
Figure 5.7 displays comparison known real-world and model simulated threat
severity with zero flow of anger. The ideal result would be distributed around
the line with slope of 45 degree.
In order to highlight the advantage of the introduction of the flow of anger,
we assume the flow is a constant other than zero, i.e. the flow of anger exists
but is exogenous to the threat-trigger-policy system. Given the flow of anger is a
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Figure 5.8: Comparison between predicted and actual threat severity with con-
stant flow of anger
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constant, say one, the differential equation system (5.5), (5.6), and (5.7) becomes
dTSi
dt
= α1TPi(t) + α2TPi(t− 1)TSi(t− 1) + α3
1 + F 2
PEi(t) + α4PEi(t− 1)TSi(t− 1)
(5.11a)
dTPi
dt
= β1TPi(t) + β2TPi(t)PEi(t) + β3TPi(t− 1)PEi(t− 1)
(5.11b)
dPEi
dt
= γ1PEi(t) + γ2TPi(t)PEi(t) + γ3TPi(t− 1)PEi(t− 1)
(5.11c)
Figure 5.8 displays comparison known real-world and model simulated threat
severity. The ideal result would be distributed around the line with slope of 45
degree.
Figure 5.6, Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8 show the threat severity under three
system stimulating the nexus of threat, trigger and policy respectively. We can
see that (1) three scenarios are not good enough for predicting the threat severity;
(2) dynamical flow of anger beats the other two scenarios.
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5.8 Conclusions and Discussion
This chapter has developed a dynamic system model to predict the threat severity
arising from food insecurity in Asian developing countries. The underlying idea
that there is only one small step between “food” and “blood”, or that there
is small distance from “hunger” to “anger” is old. Therefore the food price
index is viewed as one of the most important variables in food security and
social conflicts research [LBYBBY11]. Based on Amartya Sen’s seminal works
[Sen81] that food distribution, not food price, contributes more to social conflicts
arising from food insecurity and food shortage, and by analogy with relevant
thermodynamic systems, a model with an initial value for “anger”, a flow of
“anger”, and a “tipping point” from anger to social unrests respects the fact that
anger dynamics is complex, requires accurate linking between different variables,
and needs more data.
In order to measure initial anger level, the model started by developing a
basal characteristic index number for each Asian developing country based on 25
basal characteristics covering 4 areas (ecological, economic, social, and political)
by using the principal components analysis (PCA) technique which provides a
possible way to regress an index for comparable anger levels. Most of these
characteristics cover the period of 1990-2010 and their average values are applied.
A small subset of them depends on specific annual data because of either the lack
of accessible long term data, or credible long term stability of data properties.
Based on this basal characteristic formulation, dynamic factors that include
FAO food price index and IMF crude oil price Index in monthly level are applied
to 27 Asian developing countries to identify the flow of anger. The flow of anger is
analogous to the flow of heat in thermodynamic systems, and plays an important
role in the equation set linking threat severity, trigger potency and policy effec-
tiveness. Indeed, a dynamical system without the flow of anger is also developed
for comparison which shows the prediction with lower errors cannot reflect the
advantage of application on the flow of anger, however, with higher errors, the
system fusing the flow of anger gives a better predicted threat severity, trigger
potency and policy effectiveness, hence demonstrates the utility of the flow of
anger in predicting threats, triggers, and policies.
A first-order three-dimensional differential dynamical system consisting of
threat severity, trigger potency, and policy effectiveness is proposed to simu-
late the internal dynamics and potential tipping points. The system can predict
the threat severity for next month in a given country, given the level of threat
severity, trigger potency, and policy effectiveness this month and the flow of anger
based on the long term basal characteristic index (a constant), FAO food price
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index and IMF crude oil price Index in the month.
In order to estimate the parameters of the dynamical system, multiple linear
regression analyses are performed using the Richardson index for threat severity,
trigger potency, and policy effectiveness [RZ13] over the period 2006-2008 which
covers the most volatile food price and serious food insecurity situation. In order
to validate the system, predictions based on these fitted parameters, are applied
to predict the independent values for the Richardson index [RZ13] over the period
2009-2012.
One issue is the shortage of data for some countries. It is important to point
out that data shortage limited the components we could select for the basal char-
acteristics. Further data availability can enhance this measure. Another issue is
the potential application of localized food and oil prices. It should be emphasized
that incorporation of a local price dynamic will improve the simulation accuracy.
Unfortunately these considerations are beyond the scope of the current work.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
Complexity is an inevitable part of security for energy, water and food, but most
studies report on static modeling within a closed system. Sustainability should
be viewed in a broader context than development in the neoclassical sense. A
synthesis of complexity and sustainability for the energy, water and food nexus
demands a number of stronger methodological features than were available to
us. Embracing nonlinear dynamics encourages our better understanding on sys-
tem’s evolution than linear evolutionary than concepts based on static or ergodic
systems. Accepting a system as open is a more realistic representation than
assuming it is closed. Determinant uncertainty nourishes non-determinant phi-
losophy that implies the need of policy intervention and the possibility of good
outcomes through social change. Applying the synthesis framework to the envi-
ronmental security issues can test the validation of the method, but also deepen
the understandings on sustainability. In this thesis, we use the methods of dif-
ferential equations systems with initial values to discuss three models concerning
environmental security - namely energy, water, food.
First, we consider business cycles and macroeconomic volatility contributing
to excessive energy consumption and to excessive entropy production, conclud-
ing that the more frequent business cycles, the more intensive macroeconomic
volatility, then the more energy consumption by humans’ economic activities.
This, in fact, proves that according to the thermodynamic first law, the energy is
conserved, whereas according to the second law of thermodynamics, the energy
diffusion process is irreversible, the entropy production is inevitable, but energy
expenditure is path-dependent, therefore the different energy usage paths have
impacts on the entropy production and entropy accumulation. We also realize
that it is difficult to quantify this effect; therefore the model employs a simplified
approach, which considers only the unemployment rate and the rate of capacity
utilization producing the entropy. The results show that if we do not reduce
the frequency of the business cycles, and the intensity of the macroeconomic
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volatility, both environmental protection and sustainable use of energy would be
compromised by the man-made threats.
Second, we establish a system dynamics model comprising three subsystems,
i.e. the micro food production, micro food consumption, and macro-economy
which couples with the ecological system, but also is relatively independent. At
the micro level, both firms’ capital stock and personal wealth are assumed to sat-
isfy the Zipf’s law, and the Engel ratio is used to connect micro food consumption
and the price of the food through introducing the conception of a mark-up rate on
costs developed in the macroeconomic system. At the macro level, we follow the
Post Keynesian tradition, starting from the income distribution, combining this
with ecological economics contributions, i.e. the non-renewable natural capital
and the entropy production based on the utilization of capital stock and available
labor force to develop a Post Keynesian ecological economics model. In a case
study of the Murray-Darling basin, we combine future potential climate change
and water security for the macro-economy to present a high-dimensional differ-
ential equations system. We use the dataset covering the period 1978-2005 to
estimate the parameters in this system, then validate them based on the dataset
from the period 2006-2012. We also give a forecast for the long-run based on the
system and combined three-dimension Lotka-Volterra equations covering the rate
of unemployment, the share of profit, and the rate of capacity utilization.
Third, we develop a framework to predict the severity of civil unrest threats
related to food insecurity based on three steps - determining long-run basal char-
acteristic index, introducing the medium-run flow of anger, and forecasting the
short-run threat, trigger, and policy variables. In order to determine basal char-
acteristic index, we build a dataset in four areas for each country based on the
period of 1990-2010, then use principal component analysis to yield the index of
each country’s basal characteristic index. In order to introduce the concept of
the flow of anger, we use the differences of FAO food price index and IMF energy
price index, combined with the basal characteristic index of each country, to get
a flow of anger for each country in each month. In order to forecast threats, trig-
gers and policies in the short run, we develop a three-dimension delay differential
equations system where the threat is determined by current trigger, current and
previous policies, and the flow of anger, with the triggers and the policies follow-
ing the prey-predator model. We use the dataset covering the period 2006-2008 to
estimate the parameters in the system, and validate them based on the dataset
from the period 2009-2012. We also compare the forecast without the flow of
anger and the forecast with it.
The thesis is underpinned by business cycle and demand-driven economic the-
ories in the Post Keynesian tradition, and entropy production in the ecological
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economic mainstream. On the one hand, we contribute the nexus of Post Key-
nesian ecological economics consisting of the first investigation of the impact of
business cycles on entropy production, the case study of the Murray-Darling basin
economy in the long run, and the case study of the forecast of food insecurity
in Asia based on the introduction of the flow of anger. However, on the other
hand, we realize that further research is needed from a few aspects including the
quantification of business cycles and entropy production, the dynamic networking
in micro food production and consumption, and its impacts on macro-economy,
the potential application of localized food price and oil price, and the trial of
macroeconomic methodology from a critical realist perspective. Unfortunately
these considerations are beyond the scope of the current work.
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